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Redrawing the Boundaries of Relational Crime
ABSTRACT
One person hits another repeatedly, causing bruising and pain. Two
adults have consensual sex. Surely the first is the crime of assault, whereas
the second is private conduct beyond the reach of the criminal law. Yet
things are not so clear. In the first case, ifa father is disciplining his child,
then the assault is forgiven. And if the second case involves a brother and
sister, then consensual sex becomes a crime. The relationship between two
parties can erase criminal liability from hannful conduct or criminalize
otherwise innocent actions. Legal scholarship has mostly neglected this
phenomenon, which I term here "relational crime. " This Article offers an
examination and critique of relational crime for the post-Obergefell
constitutional landscape. It argues that the current scope of relational
crime warps harm assessments and family status. By legitimizing serious
harm, punishing harmless conduct, and importing anachronistic family
norms into the criminal law, it results in punishment that is both over and
underinclusive. Take these examples. A stepfather can beat his
stepdaughter through her childhood, then have sex with her when she is an
adult without being criminally liable for assault or incest. On the other
hand, biological siblings who first meet in adulthood and have consensual
sex are subject to prosecution and severe punishment. To remedy such
distortions, this Article introduces a new theoretical framework that
incorporates evolving notions of sexual harm, changed parenthood
definitions, and the constitutional principles of equality and autonomy
newly embedded in family law. Under this framework, categorization shifts
so that corporal punishment is no longer forgiven, and a stepfather would
be punished for sex with his stepdaughter because the power differential
renders meaningful consent impossible. Conversely, sex between two
consenting adult siblings is no longer criminal. In this fashion, my
framework rightsizes the boundaries of relational crime.
INTRODUCTION
One person hits another repeatedly, causing mild bruising and pain.
Two adults have consensual sex.
It seems easy to determine which of these two examples is a crime-
the former is an assault while the latter is private conduct beyond the reach
of the criminal law.
Yet things are not so straightforward. If, in the first example, a parent is
disciplining his child, then the action is deemed innocent. And if the second
example involves two siblings, the consensual adult sex becomes a crime.
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The relationship between two parties can erase criminal liability from
harmful conduct, or criminalize otherwise permissible actions. This
phenomenon, which I term relational crime, is undertheorized, yet it
challenges core principles of criminal and family law. Relational crime
ignores serious harms, while punishing other conduct based primarily on
disgust and cultural biases.' It also entrenches inequities within families,
such as parental "ownership" of the children entrusted to their care,2 and
between families, such as the criminalization of biological siblings who
marry.3
Despite these distortions to punishment and family recognition,
relational crime has received surprisingly little attention. Most criminal law
scholarship assumes that victims and offenders are strangers to each other,4
while family law scholarship has largely centered on state recognition of
nontraditional family forms rather than the ongoing use of the criminal law
to police family boundaries. Those commentators who have explored the
nexus of family and criminal law have almost exclusively focused on the
marital or adult intimate relationship. A rich literature critiques the historic
underpunishment of intimate partner violence and the overpunishment of
consensual adult sexual activity.7 Yet it largely overlooks the other
constitutionally protected relationship, that of parent and child. As a result,
1. See infra Part II.B.
2. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns The Child? ": Meyer and Pierce and the Child
as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 997 (1992) (critiquing parental rights jurisprudence for
positing a "narrow, tradition-bound vision of the child as essentially private property"). For an
argument that treating children as property is unconstitutional, see Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel
Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1359 (1992).
3. See Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2005).
4. For just a few examples of iconic criminal scholarship, see Dan M. Kahan, The Secret
Ambition ofDeterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413 (1999); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role
of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO.
L.J. 949 (2003). My claim is not that this presumption is wrong, as much crime is committed by
strangers, but simply that this paradigm is an ill fit for familial crime.
5. To cite just a few examples of this rich literature, see MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE
NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995);
Douglas NeJaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of Nonmarital Recognition and Its
Relationship to Marriage, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 87 (2014).
6. I have previously critiqued the focus on marriage over parenthood and the prioritization of
certain types of families in the same-sex marriage context. See Cynthia Godsoe, Adopting the Gay
Family, 90 TUL. L. REV. 311 (2015); Cynthia Godsoe, Perfect Plaintiffs, 125 YALE L.J.F. 136 (2015).
7. * See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1991);
Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117
(1996). As to the criminal regulation of sex, see, for example, Katherine M. Franke, Longing for
Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685 (2008); Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (2012).
8. This is not to deny the important scholarship on the overlap between family and criminal law,
such as the seminal work of Markel, Collins, and Lieb. See DAN MARKEL, JENNIFER M. COLLINS &
ETHAN J. LIEB, PRIVILEGE OR PUNISH: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF FAMILY TIES
(2009). Jennifer Collins in particular has written about parenthood. See Jennifer M. Collins, Crime and
[Vol. 69:1:169172
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while intimate partner violence has been criminalized and sodomy and
adultery laws repealed, anachronistic laws permitting corporal punishment
and banning incest have gone virtually unnoticed.9
In this Article, I begin to fill this gap by examining relational crime
through the parent-child dyad with an eye to the post-Obergefell
constitutional landscape. The current scope of relational liability warps
harm assessments and family status and results in punishment that is both
over and underinclusive. Consider Woody and Soon Yi. Woody, fifty-three
years old, helped raise Soon Yi, the adoptive daughter of his longtime
girlfriend.10 As her stepfather, Woody was free to corporally punish Soon
Yi until she was eighteen under the "parental discipline privilege."" Yet,
because he was not her legal or biological father, he was also free to have
sex with her when she was an adult and not be prosecuted for incest.1 2 Take
Parenthood: The Uneasy Case for Prosecuting Negligent Parents, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 807, 820-32
(2006) (researching cases of children dying of hyperthermia after their parents left them alone in cars). I
build on these works, focusing more intensely on the parent-child relationship and incorporating recent
massive shifts in constitutional and doctrinal visions of the family since they were written.
9. Incest and corporal punishment are particularly understudied. Legal feminism, which has
produced so much work on intrafamilial crime, largely ignores child abuse, perhaps because it
complicates the gendered picture of domestic violence in that the victimized woman then becomes an
offender herself, victimizing a child. See Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem for
Feminist Theory, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 75 (1993). Legal scholars have likewise largely avoided
examining the "taboo" of incest through a criminal law lens. Nonetheless, its fascination to the general
public has become apparent via popular culture, in particular recently in the very popular book and
television show Game of Thrones. The show's pairing of two attractive and powerful characters, Jon
Snow and Daenerys Targaryen, who are related but do not know it, led to dozens of articles and
commentaries wrestling with the taboo and the simultaneous fascination and revulsion it invokes.
Typical are these headlines: "Jon Snow and Daenerys Targaryen in Love: Disgusting Awesome or
Disgustingly Awesome" and "Game of Thrones Director: The Most Anticipated Incest of the Year is
Gonna Happen." Stephanie Merry, Jon Snow and Daenerys Targaryen in Love: Disgusting, Awesome
or Disgustingly Awesome?, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-
and-entertainment/wp/2017/08/21/jon-snow-and-daenerys-targaryen-in-love-disgusting-awesome-or-
disgustingly-awesome/?utm term=-.b523322cd25c; Matt Miller, Game of Thrones Director: The Most
Anticipated Incest of the Year Is Gonna Happen, ESQuIRE (Aug. 23, 2017),
http://www.esquire.com/entertainment/tv/news/a57170/jon-daenerys-romance-game-of-thrones-fmale/.
Both scholarship and doctrine need to catch up.
10. Anna Silman, A History of Woody Allen and Soon-Yi Previn Describing Their Relationship,
from "The Heart Wants What it Wants" to "I was Paternal," SALON (July 30, 2015, 3:08 PM),
http://www.salon.com/2015/07/30/ahistoryof woody allenand_soon_yi_previn describingtheir re
lationship fromtheheartwantswhatitwantsto i waspatemal.
11. I adopt the widely accepted sociological definition of corporal punishment to mean any
physical punishment, including spanking with or without objects, such as belts and other physical
disciplinary tools. See, e.g., Benjamin Shmueli, Corporal Punishment in the Educational System Versus
Corporal Punishment by Parents: A Comparative View, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 281, 281-82
(2010). As for stepfathers, I use the vernacular definition of a parental figure whose parentage is not
necessarily legally established, i.e., via adoption or even marriage to a child's mother, but rather based
on the romantic relationship with a child's mother. Accordingly, my definition includes both formal and
functional parents.
12. Every state has a parental discipline privilege exculpating parental assault on children. See
Appendix A. The Model Penal Code and many states do not criminalize sex between stepparents and
adult children. See Appendix B. This asymmetrical use of parenthood to exculpate and inculpate leads
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another example. Jaime and Cersei, twins, equal in age and, let us assume,
authority, have consensual sex as adults. 13 Unlike Woody, they would be
subject to prosecution in every state. 14 Scholars have not confronted these
inconsistencies, but we should-this distorted scope fails to protect some
victims, punishes nonculpable people, and infringes on new constitutional
norms of familial equality and autonomy.15
Using family status to exculpate or inculpate severely muddles the
assessment of harm, a key organizing principle of the criminal law.16 Harm
is obscured. A wide swath of adults are allowed to corporally punish
children, including those who they do not legally parent, despite
overwhelming evidence of its harm to children's physical and mental
development.' 7 Harm is mislabeled. The misnomer "spanking" transforms
hitting, kicking, and whipping with a belt, from assault into justified
behavior.' 8 The large majority of states term incest a crime against the
family or marriage,1 9 although the harm meriting punishment is really that
of sexual assault. Harm is manufactured. Consensual adult sex is deemed
harmful based on flawed science and mainstream disgust.20
Specifically, the myopic focus by reformers and commentators on the
marital relationship has resulted in sexual exploitation within the family
to what I term the "stepfather problem." See infra Part IID; Silman, supra note 10 (discussing Woody
Allen).
13. This example is also taken from the book and HBO series, Game of Thrones. Since the
writing of this Article, the show has introduced another incestuous couple, Jon Snow and Daenerys
Targaryen, who are aunt and nephew. As I discuss further infra Part II.A.2, the different reactions to the
two couples illustrate a great deal about the incest taboo and its use to distinguish between attractive
and unattractive people rather than to actually assess the conduct and harm, or lack thereof.
14. See Appendix B.
15. I use autonomy here to incorporate liberty and dignity values. David Meyer points out that
family constitutional cases focus on equality or autonomy, or both. See David D. Meyer, The
Constitutionalization of Family Law, 42 FAM. L.Q. 529, 529 (2008). After Obergefell, Laurence H.
Tribe has described these intertwined principles as a double helix of "equal dignity." Laurence H. Tribe,
Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16 (2015).
16. I take as a guiding principle of the criminal justice system the harm principle. Articulated
first by John Stuart Mill and theorized by subsequent scholars, it limits criminal prohibition to conduct
that harms others. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, 1 THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO
OTHERS (1984). The harm principle is not the only criterion; it is necessary but not sufficient, and it is
subject to criticism. See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 109, 113, 149-52, 182 (1999) (arguing that the criminal justice system has abandoned a
meaningful harm principle, rendering virtually any act describable as socially "harmful" and thus
criminally prohibited). Nonetheless, harm still serves a valuable role in assessing the merits of
criminalization. See infra Part h.A.
17. See infra Parts IIA, I.D.
18. See Chloe Kerr, Mind Your Language, THE SUN (Jan. 6, 2017, 1:18 AM),
https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2547037/word-spank-should-be-replaced-with-assault-because-it-
legitimises-violence-against-children-say-psychologists (reporting research that people's approval of
corporal punishment decreases significantly when the words hit, beat, etcetera are used instead of
"spank").
19. See Appendix B.
20. See infra Parts HA-B.
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being largely ignored, while parental assault is forgiven as for the "child's
own good." Not one state distinguishes between intergenerational or
vertical incest, and intragenerational or horizontal incest.21 In contrast,
sociologists and psychologists differentiate between Woody and Soon Yi,
on the one hand, and Cersei and Jaime on the other.22 Most laypeople likely
agree. Relational crime's paradigm of adult intimacy has led to a
presumption that both parties are equal, a presumption that makes little
sense when applied to the parent-child dyad.23 That relationship is
explicitly structured around the power imbalance between minors and the
24
adults entrusted with their care. Parental authority does not suddenly
dissipate when children turn eighteen; instead, the relationship remains
inherently unequal.25
This thick construction of parenthood might make sense as a family
law matter, but it worsens the harm in the criminal context. The fact that
Woody is entrusted with Soon Yi's care renders his assaults more
damaging than those of a stranger.2 6 And it is his authority over her as a
parental figure that makes it virtually impossible for her to consent to sex
with him, even as an adult.27 Assault and battery are among the oldest
21. See Appendix B. Many legal scholars do not either. See, e.g., Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-
Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and the Politics of Disgust: A Critical Perspective on
Contemporary Family Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1543, 1546 (2005). But see
Naomi Cahn, Protect and Preserve, 13 NEW CRIM. L. REv. 127, 135-36 (2010) (describing the greater
"breach of trust" in sexual relationships between intergenerational adult incest than other kinds of
incest). Incest's adherence to biological boundaries, rather than legal or functional, shows its outdated
bionormative focus and reliance on flawed science, while ignoring both psychological insights and
demographic data. See infra notes 101-01, 313-325.
22. Psychologists define abusive incest as that where the parties "are discrepant in age, power,
and experience." Richard P. Kluft, Ramifications ofIncest, 27 PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, Jan. 11, 2011, at 3.
23. Of course, there is still a gendered income and caregiving imbalance in opposite-sex couples,
but each spouse is now equal as a formal legal matter.
24. Parents' broad rights to make choices for their children are intertwined with their duty to
protect and care for them. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (describing "the
[parental] right, [as] coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [a child] for [adulthood]").
25. This highly variable definition of parental status has resulted in an asymmetric scope of
liability, wherein the scope of exculpation is considerably broader than that of inculpation, even for the
same actor. The same person is permitted to assault a child and claim the parental discipline privilege
but is often not treated as a parent for adult incest purposes and so is free to engage in sexual relations
despite the power imbalance. This asymmetric scope is depicted in Figure 1, infra Part II.D.
26. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Violence Between Lovers, Strangers, and Friends, 85 WASH. U.
L. REV. 343, 348, 391-95, 401 (2007) (noting the "unique harms associated with non-stranger violence,
such as increased victim injuries and breach of trust" and arguing that "violence that occurs within close
personal relationships . .. is more blameworthy" than stranger violence); see also Erwin Chemerinsky
& Michele Goodwin, Religion is Not a Basis for Harming Others: Review Essay of Paul A. Offit's Bad
Faith: When Religious Belief Undermines Modem Medicine, 104 GEO. L.J. 1111, 1128-31 (2016)
(arguing that harm to children by their parents is particularly problematic).
27. See discussion infra at notes 137-149 (documenting the extreme harm of, particularly,
father-daughter incest, and demonstrating that the power dynamics and breached trust render it worse
than other sexual abuse).
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recognized crimes, 28  and parental corporal punishment is the only
remaining status-based exception.29 The criminal law has also long
recognized the impossibility of consent with authority figures such as
police officers and mental health professionals.3 0 The analysis of consent
through this exploitation lens is being applied in new contexts, such as
trafficking and sexual assault by coercion or exploitation.3 1 The failure to
apply it within the family-the site of archetypal power imbalances-
leaves harm unpunished and perpetuates a traditional family model with a
gendered and heteronormative hierarchy baked in.32
Taking a fresh look at relational crime is particularly important given
the new terrain of familial and intimate freedoms. The criminal law is
lagging behind in recognition of functional parents and increased protection
for sexual choices and children's interests, a gap compounding the
theoretical incoherence of the current relational crime framework and
curtailing recently expanded autonomy rights.33 To be clear, I am not
claiming that family status is never relevant to exculpation or inculpation;
family is different and may legitimately influence criminal laws and
enforcement.3 4 My more modest claim is that as our understandings of
28. See Michelle Zehnder, Who Should Protect the Native American Child: A Philosophical
Debate Between the Rights of the Individual Verses the Rights of the Indian Tribe, 22 WM. MITCHELL
L. REv. 903, 919 n.66 (1996) ("The original seven crimes were murder, manslaughter, assault with
intent to commit murder, arson, burglary, rape, and larceny.").
29. Other status exceptions from Blackstone's time, such as the privilege to beat wives,
apprentices, and students, have all been abolished. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 120 (photo. Reprint 1979) (1768) ("[B]attery is, in some cases, justifiable or lawful;
as where one who hath authority, a parent or master, gives moderate correction to his child, his scholar,
or his apprentice.").
30. See infra notes 174-75 (discussing adult statutory rape).
31. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.4 (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft No. 2, 2015) (positing a
new category of sexual assault "by coercion or exploitation," which prohibits sex between a wider array
of authority figures, including certain lawyers and clients). See also discussion infra notes 220-23.
32. See infra Part II.C (discussing one court's treatment of stepparent-stepchild sex as "neither
illicit nor exploitative" and using the unusual, and adolescent male fantasy, example of an adult son and
his same-age stepmother); see, e.g., Kevin Carr, Six Scenes We Love From 'Bill & Ted's Excellent
Adventure', FILM SCHOOL REJECTS (Feb. 9, 2014), https://filmschoolrejects.com/6-scenes-we-love-from-
bill-teds-excellent-adventure-ceael9ab5O66/ (discussing the classic 1980's film and appreciating "the
taboo" of "the plot element of Bill's high school crush Missy .. . marrying his father and becoming his
unlikely stepmom"). Tellingly, "stepmom" is a very popular category of pornography. See Kate Feldman,
Ted Cruz's Twitter and the Mainstream Appeal of Incest Porn, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 14, 2017, 7:00
AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/ted-cruz-twitter-mainstream-appeal-incest-pom-
article-1.3494416 (reporting that in 2016 the term was the most searched term on the largest pornography
website, Pornhub).
33. See infra Parts IB-C. The criminal law was robustly used in the past to police morality, but
such a function was significantly curtailed by Lawrence. See Pamela S. Karlan, Loving Lawrence, 102
MICH. L. REv. 1447, 1458-60 (2004) (describing the Lawrence decision's protection of intimate
harmless conduct but also noting the Court's likely extension only in cases of more respectable societal
groups).
34. See Alafair S. Burke, When Family Matters, 119 YALE L.J. 1210, 1214 (2010) (noting
practical concerns about intervention in the family).
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family, gender roles, and parenthood change, relational crimes deserve
special scrutiny. In particular, because they are so prone to inculpating and
exculpating based on family status rather than criminal law values, the
harm principle should be vigorously applied to counteract this tendency for
outdated family norms to migrate into the criminal law.
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I argue for a re-envisioned
theory of relational liability to incorporate the rapidly shifting
constitutional terrain of the family and the increased focus on the criminal
harms of interpersonal exploitation. Parts II and III then take up this task.
Part II maps the distortions of harm and family status in current relational
crime doctrine and theory, using the case studies of corporal punishment
and adult incest. Part III introduces a new theoretical framework for
assessing intrafamilial exculpation and inculpation. This three-part inquiry
incorporates evolving notions of sexual harm, changed parenthood
definitions, and the family equality and autonomy principles embedded in
our new constitutional landscape. In Part IV, I apply this framework to my
case studies. Categorization shifts so that corporal punishment is no longer
forgiven, and a stepfather, like Woody, would be punished for sex with his
stepdaughter because the power differential renders consent impossible.
Conversely, sex between two consenting adult siblings, like Cersei and
Jaime, would no longer be criminal. In this fashion, this framework
rightsizes the boundaries of relational crime.35
I. THE ENTANGLEMENT OF FAMILY STATUS AND FAMILY HARMS
The rapidly shifting constitutional terrain of the family and expanded
attention to the criminal harms of interpersonal exploitation necessitate
rethinking the nexus of family status and harm. In this Part, I critique the
existing legal structures and theories of relational crime both for missing a
type of harm and for failing to incorporate contemporary family equality
and autonomy norms. In subsequent Parts, I construct and defend a new
theory of relational crime to address these flaws.
A. Current Relational Crime Framework
The family has always been a robust site of criminal regulation.
Historically, seduction, adultery, and sodomy laws criminalized non-
normative sex while marriage brought immunity from criminal liability for
35. For a visual depiction of the current scope of incest criminalization as compared to my
proposal, see Figures 2 & 3, infra note 323.
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assault. 36 The criminal law continues, albeit in a more limited fashion, to
police the boundaries of family and to mediate intra-familial harms and
interactions. It does so via a network of laws regulating marriage
(bigamy),37 adult intimate interaction (intimate partner violence),3 8 the
financial care of dependents (child support laws), 3 9 and, what I focus on
here, the scope of permissible conduct within the parent-child relationship,
as delineated by corporal punishment and adult incest laws.
Scholars and reformers alike have largely focused on the marital or
intimate adult relationship, leaving the parent and child dyad surprisingly
understudied.4 0 There are two rich strains of scholarship examining the
criminal regulation of adult intimate relationships, critiquing the historic
underpunishment of intimate partner violence and the overpunishment of
consensual sexual activity, respectively. These two literatures reflect the
two axes of family privacy, shielding intrafamilial harms and protecting the
family from intrusive state intervention.4 1
The first group of scholars argues that the law has legitimated a
gendered hierarchy within the marital dyad and obscured serious harms. 4 2
In their seminal work, Liz Schneider and Reva Siegel have demonstrated
that historic spousal immunity from assault and rape laws, often justified
for family privacy reasons, entrenches male dominance and leaves intimate
partner violence "permitted, acceptable and part of the basic fabric of
American family life."A3 In contrast to those arguing for state protection of
more vulnerable family members, other scholars question a one-track
36. Murray, supra note 7; Schneider, supra note 7, at 976.
37. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.15 (McKinney 1939).
38. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5 (West 2014); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.00, 120.15, 120.45,
240.30 (McKinney 2009).
39. E.g., IND. CODE § 31-25-4-32 (1976).
40. The first cases to designate a familial zone free from state interference concerned parental
rights. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923). Adult intimate privacy/autonomy was
first outlined in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), then rapidly expanded in subsequent
cases. Other, even very close, familial relationships are not protected. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (holding that grandparents do not have a constitutionally protected right to a
relationship with their grandchildren); Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon ofFamily Law, 57 STAN. L. REV.
825, 882 (2004) (documenting the lack of a constitutionally protected sibling relationship).
41. Feminist and critical race scholars have persuasively demonstrated the artificial and
malleable nature of the law's public/private divide. See Frances Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist
Critiques of the Public/Private Distinction, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 319, 320 (1993) ("Struggles over
power inform, fuel, and permeate the debate over the public/private dichotomy. At issue is support for
or opposition to the status quo."); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies:
Women ofColor, Equality, and the Right ofPrivacy, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1419, 1470 (1991) (noting "the
contradictory meaning of the private sphere for women of color" in describing their disproportionate
punishment for actions during pregnancy).
42. See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1989).
43. Schneider, supra note 7, at 976, 984-85. In her history of the law's treatment of domestic
violence, Reva Siegel demonstrates the concept of "preservation through transformation" as different
rationales and structures preserved immunity from punishment for men who beat their wives. Siegel,
supra note 7, at 2119.
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criminal justice approach to intimate partner violence given the familial
costs of criminal justice involvement and overcriminalization more
broadly."
The second literature centers on the criminal regulation of sexuality.
Scholars have mapped the historic criminalization of non-marital and same-
sex sex.4 5 This regulation of sexuality has been undergirded by a normative
view of family and sexual and gender norms, rather than by the notions of
force and non-consent structuring other sex crimes.46 Accordingly, many
argue for decriminalization of private adult consensual sex, a goal largely,
but not completely, achieved in Lawrence v. Texas.4 7 Going beyond
decriminalization, some scholars call for "sex-positive law," which would
affirmatively recognize the benefits of consensual sex, rather than just
prohibit non-consensual sex.48
There are exceptions to this scholarly focus on the criminal regulation
of adult intimate relationships. Jennifer Collins, for instance, has
demonstrated that parents who kill their children, whether negligently or
intentionally, are often underpunished.4 9 She attributes this to a societal
view of the parent-child relationship through "rose-colored glasses" and
argues for more consistent and stringent prosecution of parents who kill
their children.o I build on these works, and the others outlined above, with
new insights into harm generated by interpersonal power dynamics, the
significantly changed family, and the intimate constitutional map of the last
decade.5 1
Legal reforms in family regulation have also centered on intimate
partner violence and sexual freedom rather than on harms and relational
44. See, e.g., Leigh Goodmark, Should Domestic Violence Be Decriminalized?, 40 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 53 (2017) (concluding that it should not but that other approaches can strengthen the fight
against domestic violence).
45. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA
1861-2003 (2008); Murray, supra note 7. I have previously documented this regulation of sex,
particularly in the juvenile context. See Cynthia Godsoe, Recasting Vagueness: The Case of Teen Sex
Statutes, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
46. As I detail further below, incest is most often termed a crime against the family, like bigamy,
rather than a sexual assault. See Appendix B.
47. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). See, e.g., Franke, supra note 7, at 2686 (arguing that Lawrence
"explicitly limits the state's ability to punish nonmarital sex, and in so doing recognizes new rights to
sexuality outside marriage"); see also Karlan, supra note 33, at 1458 (describing the Lawrence
decision's protection of intimate harmless conduct).
48. See, e.g., Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality,
in THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES READER (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993); Katherine M. Franke,
Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181 (2001).
49. See Collins, supra note 8.
50. Jennifer M. Collins, Lady Madonna, Children at Your Feet: The Criminal Justice System's
Romanticization of the Parent-Child Relationship, 93 IOWA L. REV. 131, 133-34 (2007) (arguing that
we fail to adequately punish parents for child abuse and homicide because the law is too trusting of
parental love).
51. See infra Part 1II.
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dynamics in the parent-child context. Since New York was the first state to
criminalize marital rape in 1984,52 all other states have followed suit.
Similarly, people who assault their spouses are no longer immune from
punishment, and the law protects an increasingly wide range of unmarried
adults from intimate partner violence. 5 3 As to sexual liberty, legal reforms
beginning in the 1960s and accelerating post-Lawrence protect almost all
private adult consensual sex from criminal sanction. 54 A caveat-these
reforms are not all-encompassing; different rape liability and punishment,
as well as the ongoing lack of enforcement of intimate partner violence,
illustrate that the legally-constructed hierarchy between spouses persists.s
Moreover, the Lawrence decision explicitly exempted commercial sex,
public sex, and a few other forms of adult consensual sex from its ambit,
and harsh civil regulation of adultery and sodomy continues in a handful of
public employment contexts.56
52. People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 572-73 (N.Y. 1984).
53. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38a (1958) (protecting persons from another
family/household member or a current or former dating partner); D.C. CODE. §§ 16-1001(6)(B), (7)(B),
(9) (2001) (statute protecting persons to get a civil protection order against a same-sex partner); 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. §§ 6102, 6106 (1930) (protecting "spouses or persons who have been spouses, persons
living as spouses or who lived as spouses, parents and children, other persons related by consanguinity
or affinity, current or former sexual or intimate partners or persons who share biological parenthood");
W. VA. CODE § 48-27-305 (2013) (protecting any "family or household member" on behalf of a minor
child).
54. ELLEN ANN ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE CLOSETS AND INTO THE COURTS: LEGAL OPPORTUNITY
STRUCTURE AND GAY RIGHTS LITIGATION 98-108 (2009). Courts have found both adultery and
fornication laws unconstitutional post-Lawrence. See, e.g., Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367 (Va. 2005)
(fornication); Judge Rules Adultery Law Unconstitutional, BISMARK TRIBUNE (Feb. 28, 2005),
http://bismarcktribune.com/news/local/judge-rules-state-adultery-law-
unconstitutional/article_7aab8dd6-5cf4-5f08-blcf-e5d9faa9857b.htmi (describing a North Dakota
adultery ruling). Courts have also cited Lawrence to strike down other criminal laws prohibiting higher
penalties for assault between an unmarried rather than a married couple, see, for example, Estes v. State,
487 S.W.3d 737 (Tex. App. 2016), and prohibiting cohabitation among multiple adults holding
themselves out as married. Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1202 (D. Utah 2013), vacated as
moot, 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016). Not all states have decriminalized adultery, but remaining laws
are virtually never enforced, and many experts believe they are no longer constitutionally valid outside
of narrowly prescribed employment contexts. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of
Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REv. 27, 73. But see DEBORAH L.
RHODE, ADULTERY: INFIDELITY AND THE LAW 60-88 (2016) (noting that numerous states maintain
such laws on their books and occasionally enforce them, and arguing for the repeal of all criminal and
civil penalties for adultery).
55. See LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL
SYSTEM (2014); Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF.
L. REv. 1373 (2000).
56. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) ("The present case does not... involve
persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not
easily be refused."). As to civil regulation, see Melissa Murray, Rights and Regulation: The Evolution
of Sexual Regulation, 116 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 577 (2016). While acknowledging that "Lawrence
fundamentally disrupted the established system of sexual regulation by both providing constitutional
protection for nonmarital sex and sexuality and creating space for sex and sexuality outside of marriage
and crime," id. at 582, Murray also argues that an "alternative system of civil sexual regulation achieves
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Nonetheless, there has been a sea change in the protection of adult
intimate partners from each other and a massive deregulation of consensual
sexual intimacy. In stark contrast, the parental discipline privilege and
incest bans have been highly static. The former has remained largely
unchanged for decades despite empirical demonstration of the harms of
corporal punishment and its abolition in virtually every setting other than
the home. Incest laws are likewise anachronistic, failing to incorporate
modem definitions of parenthood and to account for the harms generated
by interpersonal power dynamics.
B. Gaps in Assessing Harms and Defining Family
The myopic focus on the adult intimate relationship and pre-Obergefell
contours of family has led to two significant gaps in the theory and doctrine
of relational crime-first, an accurate assessment of harms within families,
particularly between parents and children, and, second, a delineation of the
proper scope of this relationship for relational exculpation or inculpation.
Harm between parents and children has been discounted. The law has
historically exculpated relational harms, and even arguments for the equal
treatment of crimes committed within families overlook the fact that a close
relationship may actually increase harms or even generate new harms. The
violation of trust and conflicted loyalties can render marital rape or familial
child sex abuse worse than the same assault by strangers.59 In this fashion,
family status transforms otherwise innocent behavior into harmful, even
criminal, conduct. This harm based on power imbalances, or the potential
for exploitation, underlies adult statutory rape laws. 60 Recent anti-
trafficking laws and proposed revisions to the Model Penal Code (MPC)
many of the same punitive ends that criminal sexual regulation accomplished before Lawrence and in so
doing repudiates Lawrence's core values." Id. at 574.
57. Corporal punishment is banned in prisons, day cares, and schools in a large majority of
states. See discussion infra notes 86-87. The Massachusetts Stubborn Child Law of 1646 allowed
fathers to execute their children. See Lawrence R. Sidman, The Massachusetts Stubborn Child Law:
Law and Order in the Home, 6 FAM. L.Q. 33, 42-43 (1972). In a sense, this massive paternalistic power
endures in the significant assault and battery parents are still allowed to inflict on their children in many
states. See Appendix A.
58. The few scholars examining corporal punishment or incest view them largely in isolation,
rather than holistically as part of a coherent criminal law. See, e.g., James G. Dwyer, Parental
Entitlement and Corporal Punishment, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189 (2010) (analyzing corporal
punishment through the lens of children's rights); Cahill, supra note 21, at 1546 (giving a thoughtful
analysis of the role of incest laws in policing the acceptable boundaries of family, particularly of adult
marital-like relationships).
59. See Hessick, supra note 26, at 391-95, 401; see also Hasday, supra note 55, at 1496-97.
60. See infra notes 167-75.
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sexual assault provisions expand recognition of this harm beyond the
limited context of schools and prisons.61
Yet scholars and reformers continue to overlook the harms of
exploitation in the family context. Conflating the marital relationship with
that between a parent and child confuses the harm at issue in incest, so we
punish both vertical and horizontal incest, although there is no valid
rationale for criminalizing the latter. At the same time, parental duties are
posited to justify beatings of children that leave them physically harmed
and that would be assault or a more serious crime if committed by a non-
parent. This failure to coherently distinguish and consistently delineate the
relationship at issue has led to laws that are both over and underinclusive.
Laws punish consensual adult sex that is non-normative but harmless,
while condoning assault and sex that is exploitative based on the inherent
imbalance between parents and even adult children.
Given the significance of the parent-child relationship in determining
certain types of harm, a key question is who qualifies as a parent? The
criminal law has not accounted for significant changes in family law
doctrine recognizing functional parenthood. For instance, many states do
not criminalize sex between adult children and their stepfathers and other
functional parents.62 This both undercounts harm and entrenches
intrafamilial hierarchies. These hierarchies, and the enforcement of a single
family and intimate model via the heavy hand of the criminal law,
disregard the equality and autonomy values articulated in the Lawrence-
Obergefell lines of cases. 63 In sum, these gaps and distortions necessitate a
reenvisioned theory of relational liability, a task I take up in the next Parts.
H. RELATIONAL CRIME'S DISTORTED BOUNDARIES
This Part maps the distortions at the nexus of family status and
intrafamilial harm. Using the case studies of corporal punishment and adult
incest, I demonstrate that relational liability does not accord with
punishment norms and constitutional values. First, using family status to
exculpate or inculpate warps the treatment of harms by misidentifying or
discounting them and by criminalizing harmless conduct. Second, current
relational crime entrenches an outdated hierarchy within families and
continues to punish non-normative intimate conduct, despite new equality
and autonomy norms. This Part concludes by describing the differential
treatment of status for exculpation and inculpation-what I term the
61. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.4 (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft No. 2, 2015) (positing a
new category of sexual assault "by coercion or exploitation"); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589-1592 (2012);
Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7114 (2012).
62. See Appendix B.
63. See infra Part III.C.
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"stepfather problem." This asymmetry compounds the already warped
contours of each offense.
A. Relational Exculpation & Inculpation
1. Exculpation: Parental Corporal Punishment
Every state grants parents the right to physically punish their children.64
This exception to criminal liability for assault and battery has both common
law and constitutional roots. In Blackstone's time, a parent had the power
to "lawfully correct his child . .. in a reasonable manner; for this is for the
benefit of his education." 6 5 This privilege is also sometimes supported by a
parent's right to raise his child as he sees fit.6 6 The Court, however, has
never explicitly addressed corporal punishment, and lower courts have
disagreed about whether this right includes reasonable corporal
punishment. Additional rationales for the parental discipline privilege
include religion, 68 the pragmatic realities of child-rearing,69 and, the one
64. Most states codify the parental discipline privilege as an affirmative defense to prosecution
or as an exception to the statutory definition of child abuse. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 750.136b(9) (1967) (exception: "This section does not prohibit a parent or guardian, or other person
permitted by law or authorized by the parent or guardian, from taking steps to reasonably discipline a
child, including the use of reasonable force."); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.10(1) (McKinney 2009)
(affirmative defense: "The use of physical force upon another person which would otherwise constitute
an offense is justifiable and not criminal [when] . . . A parent, guardian or other person entrusted with
the care and supervision of a person under the age of twenty-one .. . may use physical force, but not
deadly physical force, upon such person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary
to maintain discipline or to promote the welfare of such person.").
65. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 440 (photo. reprint
1979) (1765); see also BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at 120 (positing parental discipline as an exception
to battery). Courts continue to cite Blackstone's rule as support for the privilege. E.g., Raford v. State,
828 So. 2d 1012, 1015 n.5 (Fla. 2002).
66. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (holding that parents may choose to have
their children taught a language in addition to English in school). These rights are limited by the state's
parens patriae obligation to children. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944)
(holding that the "state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things
affecting the child's welfare").
67. Compare Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 523 (7th Cir. 2003) ("[T]he . .. parents' liberty interest
in directing the upbringing and education of their children includes the right to discipline them by using
reasonable, nonexcessive corporal punishment, and to delegate that parental authority to private school
officials.") with Sweaney v. Ada County, 119 F.3d 1385, 1389 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that the
Meyer line of cases do not give parents the right to "strike a child with a belt without being"
investigated and potentially prosecuted).
68. "Spare the rod and spoil the child" remains a frequently, if incorrectly, cited biblical passage.
See MURRAY A. STRAUS, BEATING THE DEVIL OUT OF THEM: CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN
FAMILIES AND ITS EFFECTS ON CHILDREN 183-84 (1994) (detailing the relationship between religion
and corporal punishment and noting that this passage refers to a shepherd guiding or redirecting his
flock of sheep, not striking them).
69. Pragmatic proponents argue that parents need to rely on physical discipline to best help
children learn and grow, and that an occasional spanking is needed if, in the archetypal example, a
toddler runs into the street. See, e.g., L. Nicole Williams, 8 Reasons to Spank Your Kids, MADAME
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cited most often, personal opinion or "folk wisdom" about what is best for
children.70 Many jurisdictions do not state any purpose at all for permitting
parental corporal punishment.7 1 The privilege historically attached only to
fathers but has since been extended to all legal parents and guardians.72
Most states allow custodians or persons acting as a parent to assert the
privilege.73
The privilege is a justification, not an excuse, meaning that the conduct
itself is deemed innocent or not meriting punishment.74 States vary in the
scope of force allowed, but all condone force extending well beyond a
spanking.75 All states permit, for instance, hitting children with objects,
including a wooden spoon or leather belt, and many also allow face-
slapping, pulling hair, and pinching.76 Recent cases demonstrate that in
some states parents can legally hit children repeatedly with a wooden
paddle, shame them online, or even choke them.77 The influential MPC
NoIRE (Feb. 8, 2011), http://madamenoire.com/40373/8-reasons-to-spank-your-kids Accordingly, most
statutes state that corporal punishment must be for an appropriate disciplinary purpose. See, e.g., N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:6 (2015) (allowing corporal punishment "when and to the extent that he [or she]
reasonably believes it necessary to prevent or punish such minor's misconduct").
70. These proponents do not cite to any child development research, but instead rely on their own
experiences growing up or parenting. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 69 ("While some studies have
shown the negative effects of spanking, today's disrespectful youth have shown what happens when
necessary spanking is forgone.... Some kids need it, period. When time-out, talking and taking away
toys doesn't work, you have to get that butt."). This issue was also raised in a recent high-profile case
when football star Adrian Peterson was charged with child abuse for hitting his child with a stick and
stated that be simply followed the way he was disciplined growing up, a childrearing which he believed
"ha[d] a great deal to do with the success [he has] enjoyed as a man." Bill Briggs, Adrian Peterson
Case: Some Parents Say Spankings Improved Them, NBC NEWS (Sept. 19, 2014, 12:18 PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/nfl-controversy/adrian-peterson-case-some-parents-say-spankings-
improved-them-n206516.
71. Seventeen states do not mention any rationale for the parental discipline privilege. See
Appendix A.
72. See Appendix A.
73. See Appendix A; see also J.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 773 So. 2d 1220, 1222 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (finding that an eleven-year-old child was not abused when the stepfather used a
belt to spank the child on the buttocks, which caused bruising).
74. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 67 N.E.3d 1041, 1045 (Ind. App. 2016) (noting that parental
privilege is "a complete defense . .. a legal justification for an otherwise criminal act"); see also
ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.430 (2016).
75. See Appendix A. In determining the reasonableness of punishment, courts look at a variety of
factors including the child's age and gender; the form, amount, and bodily location of the hitting; and
the totality of the circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
This analysis often explicitly incorporates the reason for the discipline, as well as the related questions
of the parent's frequency of corporal punishment and other efforts to discipline the child. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Dorvil, 32 N.E.3d 861, 870-71 (Mass. 2015).
76. See Elizabeth Thompson Gershoff, Corporal Punishment, Physical Abuse and the Burden of
Proof Reply to Baumrind, Larzelere, and Cowan (2002), and Parke (2002), 128 PSYCHOL. BUL. 602,
603 (2002).
77. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 67 N.E.3d 1041, 1049 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (choking and beating
with a belt); Denene Millner, The Perils and False Rewards of Parenting in the Era of 'Digi-
Discipline,' NPR (Apr. 7, 2017, 4:01 AM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2017/04/07/504625091/the-perils-and-false-rewards-of-
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reflects a robust version of this privilege, forgiving corporal punishment as
long as:
(a) the force is used for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting
the welfare of the minor, including the prevention or
punishment of his misconduct; and (b) the force used is not
designed to cause or known to create a substantial risk of
causing death, serious bodily injury, disfigurement, extreme
pain or mental distress or gross degradation.78
All state definitions go well beyond the medical definition, which
classifies all of this conduct as child neglect or abuse. Parental corporal
punishment is widespread conduct. The majority of Americans support it
and at least half engage in it, often on babies and toddlers.80 This is not
limited to mild spanking; for instance, twenty-eight percent of parents said
that they punished children using a belt, paddle, or other implement.81
Religion, geography, and race all significantly impact the likelihood that a
parent approves of and engages in corporal punishment.82 Prosecutions
parenting-in-the-era-of-digi-discipline (describing parents who film themselves beating and yelling
derogatory names at their children and post the videos online, who receive thousands, even millions, of
likes and approving comments); The Sanford Herald, Guest Editorial: N.C. Spanking Case Raises
Questions on Parental Rights, WILSON TIMES (March 19, 2017, 7:50 PM),
http://wilsontimes.com/stories/guest-editorial-nc-spanking-case-raises-questions-on-parental-
rights,82322 (describing a recent case of beating with a wooden paddle).
78. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (emphasis added). This standard does
not require that the force be reasonable or that the parent reasonably believes the use of force is
appropriate. See id. § 3.08 cmt. 2. A number of states follow this standard. See Appendix A.
79. For instance, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) defines physical abuse as "the
intentional use of physical force against a child that results in, or has the potential to result in, physical
injury," including pushing, hitting, and beating, and explicitly states that abuse can result from
discipline. CDC, CHILD MALTREATMENT SURVEILLANCE: UNIFORM DEFINITIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH
AND RECOMMENDED DATA ELEMENTS (2008),
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/cm_surveillance-a.pdf
80. Murray A. Straus, Prevalence, Societal Causes, and Trends in Corporal Punishment by
Parents in World Perspective, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 3-6 (2010). Rates are particularly high
among babies and toddlers. See Elizabeth T. Gershoff & Susan H. Bitensky, The Case Against Corporal
Punishment of Children, 13 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 231, 232 (2007). As to public opinion, see
Steve Hendrix, The End of Spanking?, WASH. POST MAG. (Jan. 3, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/magazine/the-end-of-spanking/2013/01/02/d328cfle-3273-
1 1e2-bb9b-288a310849eestory.html (reporting that 65% to 75% of people believe that "it's okay to
occasionally spank a child"). In recent years, support for corporal punishment has declined modestly.
Attitudes Towards Spanking, CHILDTRENDS.ORG, http://www.childtrends.org/indicators/attitudes-
toward-spanking (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (using biannual GSS data).
81. See Straus, supra note 80, at 29.
82. This was the topic of one episode of the popular television show black-ish. See James
Poniewozik, black-ish Whips Up a Conversation About Spanking, TIME (Oct. 23, 2014),
http://time.com/3534219/review-blackish-spanking; see also Harry Enten, Americans' Opinions on
Spanking Vary By Party, Race, Region and Religion, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 15, 2014, 4:48 PM),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/americans-opinions-on-spanking-vary-by-party-race-region-and-
religion/ (using data from 1986-2010 to demonstrate the "large gaps" in opinion between evangelical
Christians and other Americans, reporting that African-Americans are 11% more likely to support
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appear to be reserved for more extreme cases, or those where the parent hit
his or her child in a public place, such as a school." Even in these more
extreme cases, courts are often reluctant to impose more than a slap on the
wrist,84 or are eager to find that the beatings were for the child's own good
so as to immunize the parents' actions.
Corporal punishment has been banned in almost all non-home settings,
including day care, prisons, and hospitals.86 The majority of states prohibit
its use in schools, and the Secretary of Education recently called for a
national ban.87 Nonetheless, and despite reforms to other exemptions of
criminal liability based on familial status such as intimate partner violence,
efforts to abolish or even limit the parental corporal punishment privilege
have failed.88
corporal punishment than whites, including Hispanics, and showing that people in the South are 17%
more likely to support spanking than those in the Northeast).
83. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dorvil, 32 N.E.3d 861, 865-66 (Mass. 2015). As with the
criminal justice system generally, however, there is also likely a racial and class disproportionality in
enforcement. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012). I address some of these concerns about the distributional effects
of my proposal infra Part IVA. The recent high-profile prosecution of football star Adrian Peterson for
hitting his five-year-old repeatedly with a tree branch is arguably both an example of this
disproportionality as well as a more serious case. See Anthony Zurcher, Adrian Peterson: Parenting,
Punishment and Race, BBC NEWS (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-echochambers-
29186080. Some commentators, including Peterson himself and other prominent black Americans,
argued that this type of parenting was the only thing that would have kept them safe and made them
successful adults. See Stephanie Hanes, To Spank or Not to Spank: Corporal Punishment in the US,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 19, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Society/2014/1019/To-
spank-or-not-to-spank-Corporal-punishment-in-the-US.
84. In one case, a father severely burned his five-year-old's hand over an open flame. See Stuart
Pfeifer & Jennifer Mena, Burning Son's Hand: $100 Fine, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2002),
http://articles.latimes.com/2002/apr/27/local/me-burn27. The judge reduced the father's conviction to a
misdemeanor and his sentence to a $100 fine, opining that the father merited less punishment because
what he did was "of a corrective nature." Id.
85. For instance, one court recently reversed a conviction, finding that the parental discipline
privilege applied to nullify criminal liability, despite the fact that the father was cursing and screaming
at the child throughout the severe beating. The Sanford Herald, supra note 77.
86. See Letter from John B. King, Jr., U.S. Secretary of Education, to Governors and Chief State
School Officers (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/school-discipline/files/corporal-
punishment-dcl-1 1-22-2016.pdf [hereinafter King letter] ("Corporal punishment has also been banned
in ... U.S. prisons and U.S. military training facilities, and most juvenile detention facilities. ... A long
list of education, medical, civil rights, disabilities, and child advocacy groups . . . have also been calling
for a ban on this practice."); see also Summary: North Carolina Child Care Law and Rules, N.C. DEP'T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES (April 2003),
http://ncchildcare.dhhs.state.nc.us/pdf-forms/LawSummary 11 00.pdf ("Corporal punishment
(spanking, slapping, or other physical discipline) is prohibited in all family child care homes and
centers.").
87. King letter, supra note 86 (citing extensive data that corporal punishment is "harmful [and]
ineffective" and arguing that "[a]s the evidence against corporal punishment mounts, so does our moral
responsibility to eliminate this practice").
88. See Hendrix, supra note 80 (reporting that recent proposals in California and Maryland to
limit more serious corporal punishment were "greeted with howls of nanny-state overreach" and
"hooted down"); see also Denver Nicks, Hitting Your Kids is Legal in All 50 States, TIME (Sept. 17,
2014), http://time.con3379862/child-abuse.
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Medical and psychological experts are virtually unanimous in finding
that even moderate corporal punishment is not effective at teaching
children and is in fact harmful.89 Some injury, such as mild bruising, is
expressly permitted in every state, and some statutes, such as the MPC
outlined above, condone a significant amount of injury.90 Corporal
punishment also brings significant harm beyond physical injury. A 2016
meta-analysis of over 100 studies on corporal punishment found no
evidence that spanking improves child behavior, and in contrast found
spanking correlated with increased risk of thirteen detrimental mental
health, behavioral, and cognitive outcomes.9' As long ago as the 1990s,
professional organizations such as the American Academy of Pediatrics
issued strong statements against its use.92 Many other countries have
banned it and international law prohibits it.93
One of the foremost experts on corporal punishment and child abuse,
Murray Straus, summarizes the harms: "Corporal punishment can
tremendously influence the psychological development of children . . .
serv[ing] to legitimize other forms of violence." 94 Because it legitimizes
intrafamilial violence, the correlation with future intimate partner and
parent-child violence by the child as he or she grows is significant.9 5
Children who are corporally punished are also at greater risk of decreased
89. Gershoff& Bitensky, supra note 80, at 238-41 (cataloguing research on the harms).
90. See Appendix A.
91. Elizabeth T. Gershoff & Andrew Grogan-Kaylor, Spanking and Child Outcomes. Old
Controversies and New Meta-Analyses, 30 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 1, 13 (2016).
92. American Academy of Pediatrics, Guidance for Effective Discipline, 101 PEDIATRICS 723,
723 (1998), http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/101/4/723.full.pdf ("Corporal
punishment is of limited effectiveness and has potentially deleterious side effects. The American
Academy of Pediatrics recommends that parents be encouraged and assisted in the development of
methods other than spanking for managing undesired behavior.").
93. See Constance Gibbs, France Says 'Non!' to Hitting Kids as It Bans Corporal
Punishment, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 4, 2017 10:40 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/life-
style/france-hitting-kids-bans-corporal-punishment-article-1.2934219 (detailing that fifty-two countries
worldwide have now banned corporal punishment, including most of Europe); see also Corporal
Punishment Policies Around the World, CNN (Nov. 9, 2011, 4:05
PM), http://www.cnn.com/201l/WORLD/asiapcf/1 1/08/country.comparisons.corporal.punishment
("Sweden, in 1979, was the first to make it illegal to strike a child as a form of discipline. Since then,
many other countries in Europe have also instituted bans, as have New Zealand and some countries in
Africa and the Americas."); see, e.g., United Nations G.A. Res. 44/25, Art. 37(a), Convention on the
Rights of the Child, (Nov. 20 1989), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Professionallnterest/crc.pdf("No child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.").
94. STRAUS, supra note 68, at 9. Straus and other researchers have demonstrated that even
infrequent and mild corporal punishment can lead to an increased risk of antisocial behavior. Id.
95. Elizabeth Thompson Gershoff, Corporal Punishment by Parents and Associated Child
Behaviors and Experiences: A Meta-Analytic and Theoretical Review, 128 PSYCHOL. BUL. 539, 541
(2002) finding that every one of the twenty-seven studies she surveyed concluded that corporal
punishment is associated with increases in children's aggressive behaviors).
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moral internalization, aggression, delinquent and criminal behavior, and
mental health problems.9 6
Also concerning is that corporal punishment easily elides into abuse,
and there is a strong correlation between the two. Corporal punishment and
more serious parental violence against children are driven by the same root
causes; 97 as one expert explains, "The risk of a parent going too far and
going out of control [is] way more if the parent is engaging in corporal
punishment in the first place."98 Tellingly, studies of substantiated cases of
physical abuse have found that between sixty-six and eighty-five percent of
these cases began as ordinary corporal punishment that escalated.99
2. Inculpation: Adult Incest
Almost every state criminalizes consensual sexual conduct among
adults who are related to each other, yet, as outlined further below, the
scope of these laws is enormously varied.100 Their rationales also vary, with
different jurisdictions stating historic/moral/religious,ol "scientific,"1 0 2
preservation of the family unit,103 and exploitation rationales.'m The first
96. See Joan Durrant & Ron Ensom, Physical Punishment of Children: Lessons from 20 Years of
Research, 184 CANADIAN MED. Ass'N J. 12 (2012) (reviewing over two decades of research, including
fifty studies, and finding that the vast majority of research found correlations to negative outcomes and
noting that not one study "has found physical punishment to have a long-term positive effect").
97. Hanes, supra note 83.
98. Id. (quoting Professor Kenneth Dodge) (alteration in original).
99. See Straus, supra note 80, at 21-22 (noting corporal punishment and abuse "share much of
the same etiology"); see also Gershoff, Corporal Punishment, supra note 76, at 604 (physical discipline
and abuse are "often at the core the same").
100. SeeAppendixA.
101. The religious rationale remains a very significant factor in the criminalization of incest. As
the commentary to the Alabama statute acknowledges:
(1) The law against incest may represent a reinforcement by civil sanctions of a religious
tenet. The incest taboo has been rationalized by religious theory in most societies from
primitive societies forward.... Despite the admonition of the federal Constitution to
separate church and state, this widespread, popular attitude is an important consideration in
the employment of criminal sanctions for such conduct.
ALA. CODE § 13A-13-3, Commentary (1975). Relatedly, authorities cite the long tradition of incest
bans. See, e.g., Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2005).
102. The Model Penal Code, for instance, relies in part on this rationale; it delineates incest only
by close biological and adoptive relationships. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
103. See, e.g., Heikkila v. State, 98 S.W.3d 805, 807 (Ark. 2003) (explaining that the incest
statute "protects the integrity of the family").
104. See, e.g., Lowe v. Swanson, 663 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming a prohibition on
adult incest between a man and his stepdaughter because this type of intergenerational incest is "the
kind of relationship in which a person might be injured or coerced or where consent might not easily be
refused, regardless [that they were both adults], because of the inherent influence of the stepparent over
the stepchild") (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)).
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three are the most commonly cited, although courts and legislatures have
recently increased their attention to exploitation within families.os
Illustrating the morals rationale, the offense is sometimes labeled as
"illicit" sexual relationships, 10 6 and courts continue to justify incest bans by
societal mores.5107 Tellingly, the public so struggled with their endorsement
of a recent fictional incestuous couple-Jon and Dany-from Game of
Thrones,'"o that one publication consulted a therapist to assure readers that
supporting incest was OK, as long as it was in the fantasy realm: "There's
nothing wrong with people wanting [incest in a fictional world]. The
fantasy of taboo is always going to be exciting-to have that thrill enacted,
and we know that it's fantasy. To enact that in real life, to say that's a
justification for incest, [however] no, that's not OK."1 09 No explanation is
offered for why incest must remain in the fantasy realm; the strength of the
taboo is deemed self-evident. Indeed, another expert expressed concern that
even this fictional depiction of sexy incest between attractive characters did
not sufficiently highlight "the problematic nature of [incest]" and might
normalize it too much." 0
Genetics also remains a major rationale for incest bans, with courts and
legislatures expressing concern that incestuous offspring have a higher
chance of possessing recessive, less desirable traits."' This biocentric view
105. See Appendix B.
106. Illicit is defined as "contrary to accepted morality (especially sexual morality) or
convention," Illicit, VOCABULARY.COM, https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/illicit (last visited
Sept. 20, 2017), or "not sanctioned by law, rule, or custom." Illicit, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
ONLINE, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/91445?redirectedFrom=illicit#eid (last visited Sept. 20,
2017). Illicit differs from illegal in not being limited to conduct prohibited by law, but rather primarily
referring to conduct "forbidden or disapproved of by custom or society, as in an illicit love affair."
Illegal, ENGLISH OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/illegal
(last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (contrasting usage of "illegal" and "illicit").
107. See Nguyen v. Holder, 21 N.E.3d 1023, 1027 (N.Y. 2014) (describing the "universal
horror" and "abhorrence" with which certain incestuous pairings are viewed).
108. Typical is this comment from one viewer: "Me: incest is wrong; Also me: when are Dany
and Jon going to get together?" Anna Vu (@realannavu), TWITTER (Aug. 20, 2017, 9:36 PM),
https://twitter.com/realannavu/status/899460228219117568?refsrc=twsrc%5Etfw&ref url=https%3A
%2F%2Fdailytitan.com%2F201 7%2FO8%2Fgame-thrones-romanticizing-incest-problematic%2F.
109. Tufayel Ahmed, 'Game of Thrones' Incest. Why It's OK That You're OK with Jon Snow
and Daenerys's Relationship, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 22, 2017, 12:52 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/
game-thrones-incest-why-its-ok-youre-ok-jon-snow-and-daenerys-relationship-653505.
110. Harrison Faigen, 'Game of Thrones "Romanticizing ofIncest Could be Problematic, DAILY
TITAN (Aug. 28, 2017, 1:34 PM), https://dailytitan.com/2017/08/game-thrones-romanticizing-incest-
problematic/ (quoting Janna Kim, Associate Professor of Child and Adolescent Studies at California
State University, Fullerton).
111. The majority of states do not criminalize affinial incest, indicating the concern with incest is
limited to biological relatives. See Appendix B. The Model Penal Code, for instance, specifically
considered and rejected criminalizing affinial incest, and primarily relies on this rationale; it mainly
prohibits biological relationships although it also includes children by adoption: "A person is guilty of
incest, a felony of the third degree, if he knowingly marries or cohabits or has sexual intercourse with
an ancestor or descendant, a brother or sister of the whole or half blood [or an uncle, aunt, nephew or
niece of the whole blood]." MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). Numerous courts and
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of the harm is clear in the many jurisdictions that do not ban affinial incest
or allow otherwise impermissible relationships if the couple can show they
will not be able to reproduce.1 12 Incest criminal bans are closely tied to
family law boundaries, with marriage bans mirroring or slightly exceeding
them.1 13 As to the family rationale, the MPC Commentary explains that the
central underlying rationale for adult incest bans is "the protection of the
integrity of the family unit." 1 4 Tellingly, the MPC and the majority of state
statutes categorize incest as a crime against the family or a crime against
marriage, rather than including it with sexual assault and other sex
crimes.115
States do not distinguish between what I term here vertical, or
intergenerational, incest as between parents and children, and horizontal, or
intragenerational, incest as between siblings.1 6 Every state criminalizing
adult incest penalizes in some fashion sex between biological parents and
children, and biological siblings." 7  Other than these two seminal
categories, states vary widely on which relationships they punish. Twenty-
one states prohibit parental relationships formed by adoption."8 Twenty-
eight states prohibit some stepparent/stepchild sex, although these vary in
how they define this relationship and for how long it is prohibited.l' All
states prohibit aunt and uncle with niece or nephew relationships to some
degree, but only a few include adopted or step relationships. Several states
legislatures continue to primarily rely on this rationale. See, e.g., Nguyen, 21 N.E.3d 1026-27 (noting
the "relatively small, genetic risk" to construe state statute not to preclude a half uncle and half niece
pairing). Calls by scholars and policymakers for greater regulation of sperm and egg donors to protect
against "accidental incest" also demonstrate the ongoing salience of the biological rationale. See, e.g.,
Naomi Cahn, Accidental Incest: Drawing the Line - or the Curtain? - For Reproductive Technology,
32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 59 (2009).
112. Most states also do not prohibit relationships with in-laws, where there is no concern over
recessive inheritance. See Appendix B. Others also only prohibit incest between aunts and uncles and
nephews and nieces where they are blood-related rather than through marriage. See Appendix B.
113. Twelve states criminalize sex between first cousins, whereas thirteen ban them from
marrying. See Appendix B.
114. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.2 explanatory note (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
115. Id. Other crimes in this category include polygamy, abortion, and endangering the welfare
of children. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.1-.5 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). For the other states, see Appendix
B.
116. The exploitation rationale has been used primarily to justify incest bans in cases involving
parents or stepparents, rather than to exculpate horizontal incest. Compare Lowe v. Swanson, 663 F.3d
258, 264 (6th Cir. 2011) (noting concern that relationship between stepfather and stepdaughter was
coercive) with Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 817-18 (7th Cir. 2005) (not relying on an exploitation
rationale).
117. See Appendix B.
118. See Appendix B.
119. See Appendix B. For instance, in one state the relationship is permitted if consensual (i.e.,
among adults), and three of the twenty-eight states specify that this relationship is prohibited only while
the marriage creating the relationship lasts. See Appendix B.
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do not punish same-sex incest. 120 Only six states prohibit relationships with
in-laws. 12 1 Over half of the states do not criminalize sex between
stepparents and their adult children, and all states exempt functional parents
and custodians from incest bans.1 22
Incest of all types is likely very rare behavior, although father-daughter
or stepfather-stepdaughter is by far the most prevalent type.1 23 Unlike
corporal punishment, there are no public opinion polls on incest, but it is
likely that there is a societal consensus that incest is morally wrong. This
attitude, however, may be changing slightly with younger generations
rooting for fictional couples (Jon and Dany again), engaging in incest
sexual "role play," and condoning horizontal "accidental" incest. 12 4
Given the widely varied rationales for and scopes of adult incest
liability, it is perhaps not surprising that there appears to be no consensus
on what criteria should determine who is prosecuted and what sentence is
appropriate. Prosecutions for adult-adult cases stem from application for
public benefits, reports by another family member, or a person "outing"
him or herself via a memoir.1 25 In both horizontal and vertical cases,
sometimes both parties are prosecuted, and sometimes only one party iS.1 26
Particularly inconsistent is whether the younger-generation party in vertical
adult incest cases is to be treated as a victim or an offender.1 27 Prosecutions
120. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 556 (1-C) (2006) (listing prohibited relationships
for women to include "her father, grandfather, son, grandson, brother, brother's son, sister's son,
father's brother, or mother's brother," and, for men, "his mother, grandmother, daughter,
granddaughter, sister, brother's daughter, sister's daughter, father's sister, or mother's sister").
121. SeeAppendixB.
122. See Appendix B.
123. Burke, supra note 34, at 1226-27 (citing research).
124. Again, there is no hard data on this, but one recent case illustrates the latter point. A woman
found out that her fianc6 was in fact her half-brother. The response to her anguished online post was
overwhelmingly sympathetic, also illustrating the importance of functional families, since she and the
brother/fianc6 had not grown up together. See Tess Korman, This Woman Found Out Her Fiancd is
Actually Her Half-Brother, COSMOPOLITAN (Dec. 14, 2016, 5:50 PM),
http://www.cosmopolitan.com.au/love/woman-finds-out-fiance-is-her-brother-19641 (reporting that
most of the 3400 commenters on Reddit.com, popular with millennials, were "supportive of the
relationship").
125. Some prosecutions serve as cover for non-consensual or forcible rape. Here I am focusing
on incest prosecutions for the harm of incest alone. Moreover, although I understand the need for using
other charges to punish "real" rape prosecutions given the difficulties in securing convictions in rape
cases, I have previously argued that such proxy prosecutions are not without costs. See Godsoe, supra
note 45 (in the context of statutory rape).
126. See David Epstein Pleads Guilty To Misdemeanor Incest, HUFFINGTON POST (June 21,
2011, 5:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/21/david-epstein-pleads-guil n_881639.html
("Epstein, who is still employed at the university, was originally charged with felony incest after it was
discovered he was having what appeared to be a consensual relationship with his daughter, [age] 24.").
127. See, e.g., Alexa Tsoulis-Reay, Is Incest a Two-Way Street?, SLATE (Dec. 10, 2010, 7:31
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/newsandpolitics/explainer/2010/12/is incest a twowaystreet.
html (comparing a 2010 case of adult father-daughter incest where only the (college professor) father
was charged because the daughter was "seen as the victim" with another case the same year where the
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can bring severe sanctions, including incarceration and mandatory sex
offender registration.1 2 8
Incest's harms are much more diffuse and difficult to parse out than
those of corporal punishment because the law's wide net conflates very
different sexual behavior, such as that between two adults of varying
relations versus sex between adults and children. This is compounded by
the varied rationales and scopes of incest bans and by the fact that incest is
so rarely studied empirically or even discussed by scholars and
policymakers. Generally, though, policymakers and courts cite three main
harms: the genetic harm of increased birth defects through "inbreeding,"
the societal harm of (non-marital) intrafamilial sexual activity, and the risks
of exploitation between family members. 12 9 As discussed further in Part
IV.B, the first two of these harms are not significant enough to warrant
criminalization and are inconsistent with other sexual regulation. The
genetics harm relies on flawed science, and the harm to family is too
attenuated and not closely tailored to the scope of incest criminalization.1 30
The risk of exploitation is the least frequently cited rationale' 3 ' but
constitutes an empirically proven and real harm. I argue that vertical incest
poses a great risk of this harm because it inherently entails power
differentials that call into question whether real consent is possible. The
inability of adults to meaningfully consent to sex with other adults in a
power relationship is an established legal principle.1 32 Moreover, both
psychological research and the experiences of persons who have engaged
in adult incest demonstrate that vertical incest, particularly parent-child
adult incest, is a situation where meaningful consent by the child, even as
an adult, is virtually impossible. Psychologists, for instance, consider incest
to be "abusive when the individuals involved are discrepant in age, power,
and experience.",33 Some experts go further and describe incest in general
"as a form of sexual violence . . . a form of sexual assault . .. relationships
[that are] normally one-sided and abusive."134
adult daughter was charged with a felony). I argue below that this inconsistent treatment is problematic.
See infra Part II.A.
128. See, e.g., Lowe v. Swanson, 663 F.3d 258, 265 (6th Cir. 2011) (stepfather prosecuted for
incest with adult stepdaughter and sentenced to incarceration and registry); Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d
808, 810 (7th Cir. 2005) (siblings convicted of and incarcerated for incest).
129. See, e.g., Lowe, 663 F.3d at 264; Commonwealth v. Chau, 925 N.E.2d 572 (Table) (Mass.
App. Ct. 2010).
130. See infra Part IV.B.
131. See infra Part IV.B.
132. Most states penalize consensual sex among adults where there is a significant power
differential, such as between a prison guard and a prisoner or a mental health specialist and his patient.
See discussion infra notes 167-74.
133. See Kluft, supra note 22, at 3.
134. Faigen, supra note 110 (quoting Janna Kim, Associate Professor of Child and Adolescent
Studies at California State University, Fullerton).
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There is very little research on incest; the extreme taboo and victim-
blaming have made it a difficult subject for empirical study.1 35 Virtually all
of the scant research focuses on the most prevalent type, which is adult-
child incest, in particular father or stepfather and daughter. Although the
situations are not exactly parallel, many of the findings shed light on the
harms of vertical adult incest. The research demonstrates that incest
survivors experience psychological problems and difficulty with intimate
relationships at rates that are statistically significantly higher than the
general population.1 36
One recent study of father-daughter incest is particularly relevant, even
though it studied victims whose abuse began when they were children or
teenagers. 137 The study compared incest victims with other child sexual
abuse victims and found that the effects of incest are more harmful than
child sexual abuse by another person. 38  The incest survivors were
"significantly more likely" to have sought psychological treatment, be
vulnerable to depression, have family and intimacy problems, and "feel[]
like damaged goods."1 39 The researchers hypothesized that the shame and
stigma attached to incest, coupled with the fractured relationships incest
victims had with both their parents, led to this greatly increased trauma.1 40
Other studies confirm this paradigm, finding greater psychological harms
from incest by a "father figure" than by another adult relative. 41  This
comports with research documenting the greater harm when the victim is
assaulted by a trusted person.1 42
The virtually non-existent research on adult incest is supplemented by
the narratives of survivors. These memoirs detail the power imbalances and
135. Sandra S. Stroebel et al., Father-Daughter Incest: Data from an Anonymous Computerized
Survey, 21 J. OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 176, 177-178 (2012) (noting the research difficulties in
studying incest).
136. See, e.g., Kluft, supra note 22 (summarizing research).
137. Stroebel et al., supra note 135, at 177.
138. Id. at 187-90. The study consisted of self-interviews of survivors.
139. Id. at 183.
140. Id. at 178.
141. See, e.g., Pamela C. Alexander et al., Adult Attachment and Longterm Effects in Survivors
ofIncest, 22 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 45, 52 (1998) (reporting findings that attachment problems and
concomitant depression and PTSD were not statistically related to the age of abuse onset, type of abuse,
presence of coercion, or number of abusers, but were only related to the father figure as abuser); see
also Susan G. Cole, 'The Incest Diary' is an Unbearable Read, so Imagine What It's Like for Survivors,
Now TORONTO (July 24, 2017, 1:58 PM), https://nowtoronto.com/art-and-books/books/the-incest-
diary-unbearable-read-imagine/ (noting the many additional harms of incest, including "the hugely
complicated nature of the relationship between abuser and victim and between victim and [the rest of
the family and community]").
142. E.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, Children at Risk: The Sexual Exploitation ofFemale Children
After Divorce, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 251, 276 (2001) (noting that "[m]easured in terms of frequency,




trauma of vertical incest. One well-known example is Mackenzie Phillips,
the actress daughter of famous singer John Phillips of the Mamas and
Papas. 14 3 Phillips related having sex with her father beginning at age
nineteen and continuing for over a decade. 144 Although the first encounter
was an identifiable rape, as she was passed out on drugs, Phillips
characterizes subsequent encounters as perhaps seemingly "consensual," in
that she was not blacked-out, but also a type of rape.1 4 5 Phillips relates how
her adoration for her father and desire for his attention and love made it
virtually impossible for her to meaningfully agree to this "warped and
twisted" relationship and how he kept it going through his "abuse of
power" and "betrayal" of trust as her father. 14 6
Writer Kathryn Harrison's account has less celebrity cachet but
conveys the same sense of trauma from her sexual relationship as an adult
with her biological father, whom as a child she had seen only twice. 14 7 She
describes how her fear of losing her father's love led her to acquiesce to his
demands and how he eventually blackmailed her with disclosure to keep
the relationship going.14 8 The special status of even an absent father (or
perhaps particularly an absent one?) created a dynamic of control and abuse
that, as one reviewer put it, makes the idea that this relationship was
"consensual" impossible to "occur to anyone who has read the book." 4 9
143. See Ryan Smith, Mackenize Phillips on Oprah: Why She Slept with Her Father and Why




146. See id See also Mackenzie Phillips' Family Secret, OPRAH.COM (Sept. 23, 2009),
http://www.oprah.com/relationships/mackenzie-phillips-family-secret (quoting Phillips: "Your father is
supposed to protect you, not f*** you.").
147. A very recent memoir on incest that began when the daughter was a young child and
continued into adulthood has demonstrated the complicated view of incest perpetrators and victims. See
Zosia Bielski, 'The Incest Diary': New Memoir Chronicles the Devastating Legacy of Family Sexual
Abuse, GLOBE & MAIL (July 17, 2017), https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/life/relationships/the-incest-
diary-new-memoir-chronicles-the-devastating-legacy-of-family-sexual-
abuse/article35685179/?ref=http://www.theglobeandmail.com& (discussing the book The Incest Diary).
One review accurately describes incest as "the worst betrayal of trust" and "a crime we continue to look
away from," while another expresses contempt for the victim/author, reporting her "disgust" for the
"young victim [who] is not coerced or terrified but a willing partner." See id.; Allison Pearson, This
Ticks All The Boxes of a Bestseller-But I Hated It, TELEGRAPH (July 23, 2017, 7:00 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/books/what-to-read/ticks-boxes-bestseller-hated/.
148. KATHRYN HARRISON, THE Kiss 188 (1997).
149. Luc Sante, Is 'The Kiss' Really So Awful?: Literary Criticism Turns Into a Witch Trial,
SLATE (Mar. 26, 1997, 3:30 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-andpolitics/
hey wait_a minute/1997/03/isthe kiss really so awful.html.
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B. Distorted Harms
Current relational harm doctrine and theory distorts harms. Harms are
mislabeled, empirically proven, and significant harms are discounted and
condoned. For instance, power imbalances and exploitation risks that the
law has long recognized can vitiate consent are ignored. At the same time,
conduct that is acknowledged to be harmless outside of the family context,
such as consensual adult sex, is criminalized and severely punished.
1. Mislabeled and Conflated Harms
The reliance on familial status to exculpate and inculpate can result in a
very confusing if not incoherent account of the conduct at issue, and any
resultant harm. For instance, parental corporal punishment is widely called
"spanking,"1 50 rather than what it actually is-hitting, beating, slapping,
pinching, or hitting with objects-conduct that the criminal law has long
recognized as assault or even aggravated assault.15 ' A recent study
demonstrates that this terminology has a significant effect on public
forgiveness of this conduct; child psychologists surveyed adults and found
that corporal punishment was rated better or worse simply depending on
the verb used. 15 2 The researchers recommended calling these actions assault
rather than spanking, because the latter term minimizes and legitimates
violence against children.153
The harm at issue in adult incest is also sometimes mislabeled. The
majority of states term it an offense against the family or marriage,
although it is very different than bigamy and "unlawfully solemnizing a
marriage," other crimes in this category. 15 4 Incest laws prohibit sex, not
marriage. 55 Its contours also do not comport with the wide range of
existing family units, instead following narrow biological or marital
lines.156 Tellingly, some couples who marry and are incapable of
procreation have still been prosecuted, again revealing the perceived harm
at issue to be about sex rather than the erosion of marriage or other familial
supports.1 57 And yet, as noted further below, a substantial portion of the
conduct criminalized as incest does not comport with recognized sex
150. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. §97-3-7(2)-(7) (1972) (describing spanking as reasonable
discipline of a child).
151. See id.
152. Kerr, supra note 18 (describing the report and quoting the researchers).
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.00 (McKinney 1939).
155. They are usually, however, coterminous with civil marriage bans.
156. See Appendix B.
157. See infra notes 186-88 (discussing the Muth case).
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offenses, instead constituting adult consensual sex usually deemed
harmless.
Two factors further confuse the message of the incest statutory
framework. First, the framework conflates not only adult-child incest but,
within adult-adult incest, horizontal and vertical incest.ss This sweeping
scope-bringing the same punishment obscures the very real differences in
the sibling and parent-child relationship, and the concomitant difference in
any harms stemming from a sexual relationship. Second, incest
prosecutions vary widely in who is prosecutedl 59-both parties? Only the
older one, or one deemed more culpable for another reason? The younger-
generation party is frequently prosecuted along with his exploiter.' 60 One
young woman was recently charged and pleaded guilty to incest after her
father impregnated her and demonstrated his power over her by tattooing
"Daddy's girl" on her buttocks and pimping her out for sex. 161 This
confusion of victims and offenders underscores the contested nature of the
harms at issue, and muddies the message of the criminal sanction.
2. Obscured Harms
Empirically proven, and legally recognized, harm is obscured in the
legal frameworks of corporal punishment and vertical parent-child adult
incest. The parental discipline privilege condones significant harm to
children without criminal liability. For instance, the MPC and numerous
state statutes explicitly permit parental discipline that falls short only of
risking "serious bodily injury" or death.1 6 2 Other states permit some
physical harm and mental or emotional injury as long as it is not "severe"
or "gross." 63 This concrete physical harm is permitted despite the fact that
children have been deemed more vulnerable and harm to them particularly
problematic.1 6 4 Moreover, especially vulnerable children, such as those
with disabilities or who identify as LGBTQ, are more likely to be
physically punished by their parents.1 65 These harms are often magnified
158. See Appendix B.
159. See Tsoulis-Reay, supra note 127.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See Appendix A.
163. See Appendix A.
164. See, e.g., Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1659, 1682-85 (1992). I have previously outlined that children,
particularly white, middle-class girls are deemed iconic victims. See Cynthia Godsoe, Punishment as
Protection, 52 HOuS. L. REV. 1313 (2015).
165. See Cynthia Godsoe, Parental Love and Purposeful Violence, in THE POLITICIZATION OF
SAFETY (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at notes 95-107) (on file with author) (detailing empirical
evidence).
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because of their racialized and gendered nature.166 Finally, research also
demonstrates that assault by relatives or those close to you can cause
greater harm than assault by strangers. 16 7
The exploitation harms at issue in some vertical incest are also
undercounted. Although the parent-child relationship constitutes perhaps
the ultimate power imbalance, many states continue to very narrowly
define parenthood. 16 8 This reliance on formal rather than functional
definitions leaves a large swath of persons unprotected from exploitation
by stepfathers and others who have served as parents.
Both of these harms are ones that have previously been recognized as
such in the criminal law. The conduct at issue in corporal punishment-
beating, slapping, hitting with objects or a hand, etcetera-is one of the
oldest recognized in the criminal law. 16 9 Every state criminalizes assault
and battery, even when they do not cause any physical harm. 17 0 Indeed,
many acts currently forgiven under the parental discipline privilege would
constitute aggravated assault because they involve a weapon such as a belt
or branch, or because the victim is a child. 17 1 Other categorical exceptions
to assault and battery, such as the common law privileges Blackstone
articulated to "correct" wives and apprentices, have been abolished. 172
Going further, some laws bring greater punishment for assault or battery
within a relationship such as intimate partner violence.173
The negation of consent by virtue of a power relationship is also a
harm recognized by the criminal law. Persons in positions of authority,
166. I elaborate on this pattern elsewhere. See id (manuscript at notes 99-115) (arguing that
"[p]arental punishment is also highly gendered and racialized.").
167. See Hessick, supra note 26, at 348, 391-95, 401 (detailing the "increased victim injuries
and breach of trust").
168. See Appendix A.
169. See Shlomit Wallerstein, Criminalising Remote Harm and the Case of Anti-Democratic
Activity, 28 CARDOzo L. REV. 2697, 2703 (2007) (noting that "[i]t is commonly recognized that the
concept of harm includes . . . physical injuries").
170. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 16.1 (2d ed. 2003) ("Battery requires
such an injury or touching. Assault, on the other hand, needs no such physical contact. . . .").
171. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-7(2)-(7) (1972) (where aggravating factors include "any
injury to a child" except for "[r]easonable discipline of a child, such as spanking, [which] is not an
offense" and "whether the crime was committed in the physical presence or hearing of a child under
sixteen (16) years of age"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-201 (2015) (any weapon); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 120.00 (McKinney 2009) ("a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument"); see also LAFAVE, supra
note 170, at § 16.3(d) ("In all jurisdictions statutes punish, more severely than simple assault, such
aggravated assaults as . . . 'assault with a dangerous [or deadly] weapon."' (second alteration in
original)).
172. See supra note 29.
173. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3601, 13-3601.02 (2001) (defining "domestic
violence" as a dangerous crime against victims within certain relationships and providing that the third
violation of a domestic violence offense is a felony, which may require mandatory incarceration); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 273.5 (West 2014) (criminalizing "[any person who 'willfully inflicts corporal injury
resulting in a traumatic condition upon [certain] victim[s]').
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including police officers, teachers, and prison guards, are prohibited from
sex with those under their supervision in a large majority of states. 174 A
number of jurisdictions include additional people with particular "trust" or
influence, such as clerics, 17 5 mental health professionals, 76 and athletic
coaches.177  The prohibited relationship is often explicitly framed in
custodial, disciplinary, or even familial terms. For instance, Tennessee's
felony of "[s]exual contact by an authority figure" includes both persons
"in a position of trust, or [with] supervisory or disciplinary power over the
[victim] ... [who] used the position of trust or power to accomplish the
sexual contact" and those who had "parental or custodial authority over the
[victim] and used the authority to accomplish the sexual contact."'7  This
authority need not be permanent or all-encompassing; authority figures
may include those "with temporary or occasional disciplinary control over
the other person."' 79 The underlying rationale is that voluntary consent is
impossible, or too difficult to determine, because of the extreme power
differential between the parties.'8 0 Some jurisdictions expand the scope of
prohibited relationships where the power differential, and the concomitant
"emotional dependence" of one party on another, is particularly high.'8 ' As
discussed further below, this harm of sexual exploitation by those in
positions of authority is one that is increasingly being recognized in new
contexts.1 82
174. LAFAVE, supra note 170, at § 17.3 (listing 37 states); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 21.12 (West 2011) (criminalizing relationships between school employees and adult students).
175. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(12) (West 2006).
176. Twenty-three states criminalize sex between mental health professionals and clients. See
Sherri Morgan, Criminalization of Psychotherapist Misconduct, NAT'L Assoc. OF Soc. WORKERS
(May 2013), http://c.ymedn.com/sites/www.naswca.org/resource/resmgr/imported/7_13 legalissue.
pdf.
177. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(9) (West 2006).
178. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-527 (2014); see also COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-404 (West
2013) ("The victim is in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other institution and the actor has
supervisory or disciplinary authority over the victim.").
179. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(9); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520(e)
(West 2004) (prohibiting sex between mental health professionals and their patients for two years
following treatment).
180. See, e.g., S.B. 7456B, 2011-2012 Leg., 199th Sess. (N.Y. 2011),
http://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2011/s7456/amendmenta/a (providing that a patient is
"deemed incapable of consent" to sex with her mental health or health care provider); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 750.520(e) (2004) ("The consent of the victim is not a defense."); see also Galia Schneebaum,
What is Wrong with Sex in Authority Relations? A Study in Law and Social Theory, 105 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 345, 346-47 (2016) (describing these offenses to "share a common element: they all
proscribe sexual contact within a certain type of social relationship in which one side holds a position of
power over the other").
181. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-71(a)(6) (West 2012) (prohibiting sex between
mental health professionals and their clients and barring sex with former clients who are "emotionally
dependent").
182. See discussion infra Part I.A.
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3. Manufactured Harms
In addition to undercounting certain harms, relational crime also
punishes harmless conduct. Consensual adult sex is one such category of
conduct; indeed, consent has become the barometer between societally
approved sex and sex worthy of punishment. 183 Accordingly, it has been
decriminalized in non-marital contexts and with multiple partners.1 84
Outside of a narrow range of recognized and extreme power imbalances,
like the adult statutory rape laws I outlined above, people are free to choose
their sexual partners and are not protected from doing so against every
imbalance in bargaining power. Horizontal incest laws, however,
manufacture harm based on flawed science or attenuated family harms to
continue to punish harmless, but non-normative conduct.'85
C. Distorted Family Status
The relational crime framework also warps family status. It entrenches
hierarchies within families and punishes non-normative family units and
intimate conduct.
1. Entrenches Intrafamilial Hierarchy
The doctrines of corporal punishment and adult incest illustrate the
ways relational crime serves to entrench power hierarchies within families.
The parental discipline privilege is the only categorical exception to assault
and battery laws, granted to those entrusted with the care of society's most
vulnerable members. Similarly, the limitation of incest bans in many states
to biological parents serves to condone gendered and hierarchal sexual
relationships between stepfathers and daughters. This hierarchy
underprotects some family members, infringing on their autonomy and
equality. Indeed, allowing parents to beat their children, or have sex with
them when they reach adulthood, is reflective of outdated notions of
ownership, children as property, a legal construction that cannot be
supported in contemporary society.186
183. See JOSEPH J. FISCHEL, SEX AND HARM IN THE AGE OF CONSENT 7 (2016).
184. See discussion supra note 54. As I discuss further below, some private consensual sex has
also been found to be constitutionally protected. See discussion infra Part III.C. Here, I am making the
related, but more modest, point that it has been deemed more beneficial to personhood than harmful.
185. For a more detailed discussion of the flawed nature of these rationales for criminalization,
see infra Part IV.B.
186. See generally Amar & Widawsky, supra note 2 (arguing that treating children like parental
property is unconstitutional); see also Woodhouse, supra note 2.
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2. Perpetuates Interfamilial Hierarchy
The criminal law in the relational context also imposes a hierarchy
among families. The scope of liability perpetuates a biocentric, gendered,
and heteronormative family, while leaving other families unrecognized and
vulnerable to punitive state intervention. Incest prohibitions are explicitly
tied to family law boundaries more than any other crime.187 Accordingly,
incest bans reflect the same traditional marital family structure dominating
constitutional law until very recently. Two examples are the laws'
exclusion of non-biological adoptive parents, stepparents, and functional
parents, and the ongoing failure to criminalize same-sex adult incest in a
few states. 88
Courts and legislatures import their own views of appropriate sexual
relations and families to condone certain arguably exploitative relationships
that follow traditional patterns, and to punish consensual ones that violate
deeply embedded moralistic, cultural norms. As a result, prosecutions and
sentences are highly dependent upon the judge's or other state actor's
impression of that family, including their class and lifestyle and, of course,
their sexual intimacy. 189 As Courtney Cahill has described it, disgust and
ideological beliefs about "natural" families have made incest a particularly
adept tool for excluding non-normative families, including adoptive and
same-sex families.1 9 0
Compare these two cases. The first court construed its state incest ban
to exclude stepparents, reasoning that these sexual relationships may be
"neither illicit nor exploitative, as, for example, where a grown man
marries his stepmother, who may be his own age, after his father's
death." 91 Note the court's gendered assumptions that the stepmother might
well be considerably younger than her husband-the age of his son-and
that the son will have no problem having sex with someone who had served
in some sort of parental fashion, even if just tangentially-perhaps because
he is male and so not as easily exploited?1 9 2 The second court upheld eight
and five year prison sentences, respectively, for a brother and sister who
187. California, for instance, punishes incest among "[p]ersons being within the degrees of
consanguinity within which marriages are ... incestuous and void." CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 285, 785
(West 2014).
188. See, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 17, § 556 (2006) (listing only opposite-sex prohibited
relationships).
189. See Note, Inbred Obscurity: Improving Incest Laws in the Shadow of the "Sexual Family,"
119 HARV. L. REv. 2464, 2478-82 (2006) (discussing cases).
190. See Courtney Megan Cahill, The Oedipus Hex: Regulating Family After Marriage Equality,
49 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 183 (2015); see also Cahill, supra note 21.
191. Commonwealth v. Rahim, 805 N.E.2d 13, 19 (Mass. 2004).
192. Of course, sex between stepfathers and daughters is far more common than this near-fantasy
tale. See, e.g., State v. Ortiz-Valencia, 801 P.2d 57 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990); State v. Little, 861 P.2d 154
(Mont. 1993).
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grew up in separate households, met as adults, married, and had children.1 93
In doing so, the judge appeared to "recoil[]" from the siblings' relationship,
viewing them as a "moral horror[]."l9 4 The trial judge's obsession with
their sexual intimacy, despite the lack of any genetic harm (Mrs. Muth had
voluntarily been sterilized), is clear: "I [believe] severe punishment is
required in this case. .. . I think they have to be separated. It's the only way
to prevent them from having intercourse in the future."1 95
Again, the fascination around Game of Thrones and the different public
reactions to two incestuous pairings illustrates this point. Cersei and Jaime,
who have committed numerous violent acts and are not popular with
viewers, are reviled for their incest, while the attractive, younger, and more
benevolent Jon and Dany are supported. As one viewer writes: "So
#GameofThrones has taught me that I'm against twin incest but
aunt/nephew incest is totally fine."' 9 6 Or another: "[E]veryone watching
[J]aime and [C]ersei: 'ew this is gross' [as opposed to] everyone watching
[flon and [D]aenerys: #GameOffhrones."l 97 The tendency to forgive one
pair and condemn the other for the same or even less culpable (horizontal)
pairing demonstrates the malleability of the crime of incest. This distinction
is not based on harm, or culpability, but rather on whether or not we "like"
those involved-an illegitimate distinction and one that risks arbitrary or
selective enforcement. 98
D. The Stepfather Problem
Even more than these two crimes themselves, the interaction of
corporal punishment and incest laws demonstrate the problematic contours
193. Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 810 (7th Cir. 2005). The state also terminated their parental
rights because of their incestuous relationship. Id. That and the long periods of incarceration forcibly
broke up one self-described family. Id. at 812.
194. Matthew J. Franck, Kissing Sibs: Could the Supreme Court Embrace Incest?, NAT'L REV.
(Aug. 4, 2005, 8:12 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/215103/kissing-sibs-matthew-j-
franck (discussing the Seventh Circuit opinion in Muth).
195. Jeff Jacoby, Hypocrisy on Adult Consent, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 28, 2005),
http://archive.boston.com/news/globe/editorialopinion/oped/articles/2005/08/28/hypocrisy on adult_c
onsent. The Muths were a marginalized family in other ways as well, having struggled with poverty,
addiction, and involvement with the child protective system. Muth, 412 F.3d at 811.
196. Alyssa Neumann (@lyssaneumann), TWITTER (Aug. 27, 2017, 9:52 PM),
https://twitter.com/lyssaneumann/status/902000816462077952?refsrc-twsrc%5Etfw&ref url=https%3
A%2F%2Fwww.buzzfeed.com%2Fjennaguillaume%2Fthis-ship-has-sailed.
197. Kathleen (@kathleen hanley), TWITTER (Aug. 27, 2017, 9:19 PM),
https://twitter.com/kathleen-hanley/status/901992585882951682?ref src-twsrc%5Etfw&ref url=https
%3A%2F%2Fwww.elitedaily.com%2Fentertainment/o2Ftwitter-got-sex-scene%2F2053370 (using a
"gif" featuring a woman saying, "It's so beautiful," to describe Jon and Dany's relationship).
198. Of course, there may be other reasons viewers distinguish between the two couples,
including the fact that Cersei and Jamie have children and know they are related to each other, but I
believe, as many viewers acknowledge, that the distinction is largely based on a gut reaction. Such gut
reactions should not determine criminalization and prosecution.
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of relational crime. Parenthood is defined very differently in these two
contexts, broadly and in functional terms for corporal punishment, and very
narrowly and in formal, often purely biological, terms for adult incest. As a
result, the scope of relational exculpation is considerably broader than the
scope of inculpation, because the same person is deemed a parent for
exculpation and a non-parent excusing him from inculpation.
I will illustrate this asymmetry using the example of stepfathers. The
treatment of stepfathers presents a particularly helpful lens into definitional
problems because they are some of the most common offenders in these
two instances 199 and yet are defined very differently for each. I define
stepfathers here in their most common iteration as a parental figure whose
parentage is not necessarily legally established via adoption or even
marriage to a child's mother, but rather comes through his romantic
relationship with a child's mother.2 00 I examine this problem in terms of
men in relationships with women, as this is by far the most frequent
scenario in the case law, 2 0 1 but a similar analysis could apply to
stepmothers and to same-sex couples.
Stepfathers: Corporal Punishment Legality and Incest Liability by
State202
As the preceding diagram demonstrates, the large majority of states
accord the parental discipline privilege to stepfathers and other persons
199. See supra note 192 and infra note 206.
200. Most dictionary definitions do not turn on legal parentage and instead focus on marriage.
See, e.g., Step-father, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 19 10) ("The man who marries a widow, she
having a child by her former marriage ... is step-father to such child.").
201. See discussion supra note 199.
202. Figure 1 represents the laws of all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the Model Penal
Code as of December 31, 2016, as summarized in Appendix B.
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who are not legal, biological, or adoptive parents.203 Forty states allow
custodians to assert the privilege, 20 4 and thirty-four go even further,
allowing adults in loco parentis, those "acting like a parent," to do so. 20 5
The statutes do not define terms, including stepparents, and there is
likewise surprisingly little discussion of the scope of parenthood in
corporal punishment cases; instead, parental status is almost always
assumed.2 06 Accordingly, a significant number of people without a legal or
significant caregiving relationship to a child, such as a mother's boyfriend,
are permitted to corporally punish that child.
In contrast, incest laws define parents much more narrowly for
inculpation. Only twenty-one states criminalize incest between adoptive
parents and children.20 7 A slight majority of states, and the MPC, do not
criminalize sex with stepparents. 20 8 Those that do narrowly define
stepparents to include those married to the child's parent. Several states
erase this liability once the marriage ends through divorce or death; unlike
biological or adoptive parents, the former stepparent is deemed to be only
temporarily a parent during the marriage. 20 9 Not one state criminalizes
incest for custodians or persons in loco parentis. This extremely formalist
approach does not recognize the reality of families where numerous
unmarried stepparents, or formerly married stepparents, are parents in the
real sense of the term.
To return to my earlier example, film director Woody Allen helped
raise Soon Yi from the time she was a young girl and was adopted by
Allen's long-time partner and co-parent of other children, Mia Farrow. 2 10
Many in the family referred to him as Soon Yi's "stepfather," although he
203. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.031(C) (West 2006) (defining child abuse but
excluding "a child exhibiting evidence of corporal punishment or other physical disciplinary measure
by a parent, guardian, custodian, person having custody or control, or person in loco parentis"); J.C. v.
Dep't of Children and Families, 773 So. 2d 1220, 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that an
eleven-year-old child was not abused when his stepfather used a belt to spank the child on the buttocks,
bruising him).
204. See Appendix A.
205. See Appendix A.
206. See, e.g., Howard v. McGinnis, 632 F. Supp. 2d 253, 260 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (stepfather);
Kama v. State, 507 So. 2d 154, 154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (stepfather); State v. Miller, 98 P.3d 265,
266-67 (Haw. Ct. App. 2004) (uncle).
207. See Appendix B.
208. See Appendix B.
209. Very few states, only eleven and thirteen respectively, include adoptive or step-
grandparents in criminal incest prohibitions. See Appendix B.
210. Maria Vultaggio, Woody Allen, Wife Soon-Yi and Their Bizarre History: Ronan Farrow





and Farrow were not married and maintained separate residences. 2 11 Allen
would qualify under New York's parental discipline privilege to physically
punish Soon Yi, as it covers "[a] parent, guardian or other person entrusted
with the care and supervision of a [minor]."212 Yet, Allen was not
prosecuted for the sexual relationship he began with Soon Yi soon after she
reached adulthood, because the state incest ban covers only biological
parents, not adoptive or stepparents.2 13
I am not claiming that the scope of criminal coverage must be exactly
coterminous for every encounter between two actors-here the stepfather
and child. Yet in this case, the power accorded broadly in the first
instance-to assault and then assert as a justification for full exculpation
that one is a parent-is part of what creates the harm in the second
instance-the exploitation and difficulty of consent between a parent and
even an adult child. The extremely different definitions of parent used in
these two instances worsen the harm, and then obscure it because
functional parents and stepfathers are not covered under many adult incest
statutes. This interaction between the two crimes also further enshrines
traditional gendered family hierarchies by normalizing sex between two
parties, even where one, usually the older man, has tremendous power over
the other, usually a younger woman.
III. RELATIONAL CRIME THEORY FOR THE POST-OBERGEFELL WORLD
In Parts I and II, I used incest and corporal punishment to map the
distortions in current relational crime doctrine and theory. I turn in this Part
to the normative, introducing a new theoretical framework for assessing
relational crime that incorporates evolving notions of sexual harm, changed
parenthood definitions, and the new constitutional terrain of the family.
This three-part inquiry first scrutinizes the harm, then assesses whether
family status mitigates or generates these harms, and finishes by tailoring
the scope of family status to best capture the relational power dynamics.
A. Unraveling Exploitation and Moral Harns
Essential to a workable theory of relational crime is a coherent
assessment and treatment of harms. Consistently defining and punishing
harms is a hallmark of any legitimate criminal law framework, particularly
211. Beverly Beyette, Houses Divided: The Woody-Soon Yi Romance Has Sparked Questions
About the Complex Ties That Bind the Modern Family: Stepfamilies: '(Romance) happens primarily
because boundaries are very unclear,' one sociologist says., L.A. TIMES (Sept. 3, 1992),
http://articles.latimes.com/1992-09-03/news/vw-7384_1-woody-allen.
212. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.10(1) (McKinney 2009).
213. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.25 (McKinney 1939).
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in the current climate of rampant overcriminalization.2 14 To this end, we
must disentangle recognized harms from moral distaste and scrutinize
exculpation for obscured harms.
The harm principle is not the only consideration in determining what
conduct should be criminalized, but it remains a dominant one. 2 15 Criminal
law theorists past and current have posited substantive harm as a constraint
on criminalization, along with moral desert or wrongfulness.2 16 A robust
application of the harm principle allows for distinguishing between conduct
that should be punished and conduct that is merely unpopular or non-
mainstream. As H.L.A. Hart argued fifty years ago: "First, we must ask
whether [conduct] is harmful, independently of its repercussion on the
general moral code."2 17 This argument has only grown stronger with
Lawrence and increased concerns about overcriminalization. The
punishment of harmless conduct and the failure to punish harmful conduct
are both problematic.2 18
Harm is not, however, as simple a concept in assessing criminalization
as it might at first appear. Bernard Harcourt has persuasively demonstrated
that the harm principle is elastic and indeterminant, and that its failure to
address the "comparative importance of harms" renders it less useful as a
limiting principle.2 19 In the cases of relational crime discussed here,
however, the harm is to a specific victim, the child, whether an adult or still
a minor. Accordingly, we are not discussing remote harm, which is more
amorphous and controversial. 22 0 Despite his (warranted) pessimism about
the harm principle as a meaningful limitation on criminalization, Harcourt
214. One of the earliest scholars to predict this troubling dynamic was Sanford Kadish who, long
before Lawrence, argued against the criminalization of widespread, harmless behavior, particularly in
the sexual realm. See Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing
Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904 (1961). Overcriminalization is the most pressing criminal justice
problem of our time. For a seminal account, see William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of the
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001).
215. See, e.g., Wallerstein, supra note 169, at 2699 (describing the harm principle as "the most
commonly recognised criterion for criminalisation in democratic societies").
216. See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 16; DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE
LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW 65 (2008); see also Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of
Overcriminalization. From Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747,
758, 768 (2005) (documenting the use of fornication and adultery to illegitimately impose mainstream
morality on unpopular groups).
217. See H.L.A. Hart, Immorality and Treason, LISTENER, July 30, 1959, at 162-63 (concluding
that the regulation of private adult consensual sexual activity such as sodomy did not meet this test).
218. See, e.g., Godsoe, supra note 164 (critiquing the punishment of prostituted young people
and the failure to adequately punish, if at all, their customers/abusers); HuSAK, supra note 216.
219. Harcourt, supra note 16, at 182. Relatedly, scholars are concerned about the harm principle
being "co-opted by legal moralism." See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Prevention, Wrongdoing, and the
Harm Principle's Breaking Point, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 685, 691 (2013) (discussing Harcourt's
work).
220. See, e.g., Wallerstein, supra note 169, at 2712.
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does support a costs and benefits analysis of various harms. 2 2 1 This is
exactly how I intend the harms assessment of family harms to proceed.
The harm assessment should be based on empirical data. Numerous
scholars and reformers have called for a greater reliance on data across the
222criminal justice system. A reliance on folk wisdom and emotions such as
disgust, rather than research and science, is a particular problem in the
regulation of sexual behavior and family-related crimes.2 2 3 Recognizing
this, one prominent legal scholar argues that Lawrence "implicitly
demand[s] that states defend laws governing sexual conduct with evidence
that this conduct is causing harm to other people."224 When punishment is
not data-driven, it is arguably flawed from both a retributive and
225instrumentalist perspective.
The harm at issue should also be properly labeled. The criminal law
serves an important expressive purpose,226 which is diluted and muddled
without the accurate and coherent labeling of harm. Accordingly, in the
intimate partner violence and marital rape context, scholars and reformers
have argued for the importance of criminalization to "defin[e] battering as a
public harm," rather than its traditional depiction as a private, family
matter.227
Assault and battery have long been recognized as criminal harms,
whether or not they result in injury.228 The harm of sexual exploitation by
221. See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle Redux: On Same-Sex
Marriage, the Supreme Court's Opinion in United States v. Windsor, John Stuart Mill's Essay on
Liberty (1859), and H.L.A. Hart's Modern Harm Principle (Chi. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working
Paper No. 437, 2013), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=142 1 &context-
publiclaw and legal theory; see also Steven D. Smith, The Hollowness of the Harm Principle 58
(Univ. of San Diego Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 17, 2004),
http://digital.sandiego.edulwps_public/artl7 (critiquing the harm principle but concluding that it is still
useful because "[e]veryone can embrace the principle and simply count as 'harms' injuries to the sorts
of values or interests for which protection would be prescribed by his or her theory of government or
the good life").
222. See, e.g., Michael Tonry, Policing to Parole: Reconfiguring American Criminal Justice, in
46 CRIME AND JUSTICE 10-11 (Michael Tonry ed., 2017) (calling for "rationality [and] evidence" in
policy making); see also HUSAK, supra note 216, at 153 (concluding that the empirical data show that
many drug offenses do not merit criminalization).
223. Cahill, supra note 21; see also Allegra M. McLeod, Regulating Sexual Harm: Strangers,
Intimates, and Social Institutional Reform, 102 CALIF. L. REv. 1553, 1621 (2014) (arguing this
contributes to "[t]he profoundly dysfunctional criminal regulation of sexual harm").
224. William Eskridge, Jr., Revolution in Waiting: Taking the Pulse of Gay Rights in the Courts,
SLATE (June 20, 2008, 7:56 AM) http://www.slate.com/articles/newsandpolitics/
jurisprudence/2008/06/ revolutioninwaiting.html.
225. See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AN AMERICAN TRAVESTY: LEGAL RESPONSES TO
ADOLESCENT SEXUAL OFFENDING xiv (2004) (contending that the punishment of adolescent sex
offenders is flawed because it ignores empirical and scientific evidence and depends largely on
stereotypes).
226. See, e.g., Dan Kahan, supra note 4, at 424.
227. Schneider, supra note 7, at 994.
228. See 1 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D §# 2-3 (1988).
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those in positions of authority is also a criminal harm in most jurisdictions,
and it is one that has recently been recognized in new contexts of
trafficking and more broadly sexual assault. 22 9 Trafficking laws and
prosecutions also aim to capture the harm of non-consent by reason of
exploitation, in the prostitution context. The federal Trafficking Victims
Protection Act (TVPA) and state laws define trafficking as inducing a
person into a commercial sex act (prostitution, pornography) "by force,
fraud, or coercion."2 30 Fraud involves false promises regarding
employment, wages, working conditions, or other matters. Coercion
includes the abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process. The TVPA also
categorizes anyone under age eighteen as a minor even without a showing
of coercion.
There is also a growing recognition of exploitation harms in defining
sex offenses. Although most states do not currently criminalize sex by
economic or psychological coercion or fraud, some, and the federal
government, have recently begun to take account of exploitation and non-
physical coercion in considering consent to sex.2 3' Significantly, the
proposed revisions to the MPC include a new category of sexual assault
"by coercion or exploitation." 2 3 2 It criminalizes sexual intercourse where
consent is obtained by, for instance, threatening to accuse someone of
criminal action, including immigration matters, or "expos[ing] any
information tending to impair the credit or business repute of any
person."233 It also punishes intercourse via exploitation, defined to include
professionals representing someone in a criminal or family law matter or
treating them for mental illness.234 In so doing, the MPC drafters note the
harm of non-violent coercion and analogize to financial crimes such as
fraud and extortion.235 They also acknowledge the need to protect the
"dependent party [in the professional relationship] from the risks of
exploitation and diminished freedom of choice." 236 This trend is consistent
229. See supra notes 174-182 (discussing adult statutory rape laws). For a discussion of
trafficking laws, see Godsoe, supra note 164 (discussing the commercial sexual exploitation of minors);
see also MARCIA A. ZUG, BUYING A BRIDE: AN ENGAGING HISTORY OF MAIL-ORDER MATCHES
(2016) (describing the shift in consideration of arranged or 'mail-'order" marriages to a more recent
lens of exploitation and trafficking).
230. 22 U.S.C. § 7102(9) (2012).
231. A handful of states do, however, punish intercourse obtained by threats of humiliation,
extortion, and "use of physical, intellectual, moral, emotional, or psychological force, either express or
implied." MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. 2.a. at 39 (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft No. 2, 2015)
(collecting state laws).
232. Id. §213.4.
233. Id. § 213.4(1)(a)(ii).
234. Id. § 213.4(2).
235. Id. §213.4 cmt. I at 77.
236. Id. § 213.4 cmt. 3.a at 96.
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with the work of numerous scholars who have framed rape as a crime
against autonomy or sexual integrity rather than about physical force.237
B. Defining Family in Functional Terms
In addition to scrutinizing and accurately assessing harms, a theory of
relational crime must also correctly delineate family relationships. Familial
status operates both to protect those within the family-for instance,
against exploitation by a functional parent-and protect the family unit
from unwarranted state intervention-for instance, against interference
with adults' right to consensual albeit non-normative sexual intimacy.
Expanding definitions of parenthood incorporate functional as well as
formal family statuses, permitting the capture of power dynamics, essential
to truly parsing out relational crimes.2 38
Recognition of functional family members accords with both growing
scholarly critique and an emerging doctrinal trend. Following Martha
Fineman's seminal critique of the law's prioritization of the reproductive,
sexual family centered on marriage and biology, 23 9 scholars have argued
that the law's exclusion of families who do not meet a normative ideal is
both illegitimate and not reflective of the reality of most families. 24 0 This is
even more true today; in 2016, the majority of American households are
"non-traditional," meaning unmarried, cohabitating, or single parent
households. 2 41 Families needing greater recognition include non-marital,
adoptive, same-sex, and functional (including step) families.242 This
recognition is particularly important in the parenthood context, given
children's inherent dependence, both financial and physical.2 43
The law of parenthood has begun to change in response to these
critiques, the evolving demographic reality, and the expanding boundaries
237. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND
THE FAILURE OF LAW (2000).
238. I am recommending that functional parents supplement the existing routes to parenthood
recognition via biology, marriage, and adoption, not replace them.
239. FINEMAN, supra 5 at 38.
240. See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood
to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459,
461-64 (1990); Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital Families,
67 STAN L. REv. 167 (2015).
241. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA'S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS:
2016, TABLE H3 (last revised Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/
farnilies/cps-2016.html.
242. See Murray, supra note 56; see also Polikoff, supra note 240.
243. The privatization of dependency is a key function of family law. See Susan Frelich
Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex, Old and New, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 347, 363-64
(2012).
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of marriage.24 4 In the last decade, parental definitions have become more
fluid, and currently a majority of states recognize some form of functional
245parent. De facto parents or parents by estoppel are treated like legal
parents with standing to petition for custody or visitation. A major impetus
for this trend has been the recognition of same-sex marriage as a
fundamental right. Two state high courts, for instance, recognized de facto
parenthood in 2016, relying heavily on Obergefell to do so. 24 6 In this way,
courts and legislatures continue to connect marriage and parenthood, albeit
to recognize parents outside of the traditional biomarital paradigm. This,
coupled with the focus on children's interests in the recognition of
functional parents, suggests that the new constitutional landscape of
Lawrence-Obergefell is not limited to the adult intimate relationship.
To be clear, biology and marriage continue to do significant work in
defining parenthood; aspiring functional parents have to meet a very high
bar after an intensive factual analysis. The ALI test, for instance, requires
that the adult
["F]or a significant period of time not less than two years,
(i) lived with the child and,
(ii) for reasons primarily other than financial
compensation, and with the agreement of a legal parent to
form a parent-child relationship ...
(A) regularly performed a majority of the
caretaking functions for the child, or
(B) regularly performed a share of caretaking
functions at least as great as that of the parent with
whom the child primarily lived."2 47
244. Although I focus here on parenthood, it is worth noting that a similar-trend is emerging with
adult intimate partners, both in scholarly critiques and doctrine. See, e.g., Cynthia Grant Bowman, The
Legal Relationships Between Cohabitants and Their Partners' Children, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
127 (2012) (calling for recognition of rights and responsibilities between cohabitants and between
cohabitants and their children).
245. Some do so by statute and some by judicial decision. See, e.g., IND. CODE
ANN. § 31-9-2-35.5 (West 2008); Conover v. Conover, 146 A.3d 433 (Md. 2016); In re
Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005). Functional parenthood is not an entirely modem
concept; historically, the in loco parentis doctrine operated to recognize those who acted as parents but
did not have the legal status. See 59 AM. JuR. 2D Parent and Child § 9, Westlaw (database updated
2016) ("[A] person stands in loco parentis when he or she puts himself or herself in the situation of a
lawful parent by [voluntarily] assuming the obligations incident to the parental relation without going
through the formalities necessary to a legal adoption."); see also Smith v. Smith, 922 So. 2d 94 (Ala.
2005) (detailing the status).
246. See Conover, 146 A.3d at 453 (Md. 2016); Brook S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488,
490 (N.Y. 2016) (noting that a narrow and rigid parenthood definition "has become unworkable when
applied to increasingly varied familial relationships").
247. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
2.03(c) (AM. LAW. INST. 2002).
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Similarly, one state statute requires that a de facto parent have taken on the
full responsibilities of a parent, have held herself out as the child's parent
with the permission of the other parent, and either (1) lived with the child
since birth or adoption or (2) lived with the child for ten months out of the
last year and, finally, have formed a "strong emotional bond" with the
child.248 Nonetheless, the increasing recognition of functional parenthood
represents a sea change in family law doctrine--one that should inform the
criminal law.
C. Incorporating New Constitutional Norms ofFamilial Equality and
Intimate Autonomy
The new constitutional landscape of familial recognition and freedom
of adult sexual intimacy also must inform relational crime theory. The
Lawrence-Obergefell line of cases can be read to limit the state's power to
enforce a single familial model, particularly via the harsh mechanism of the
criminal law, and even to suggest some personhood or quasi-rights for
children. This reading does not mean that courts and legislatures will
readily change the law; political and majoritarian influences remain
strong. 24 9 Nonetheless, this line of cases has and will continue to
significantly change family definitions and structures.
I will only briefly sketch the trio of cases underlying the radically
altered landscape of intimate-familial relations as they are undoubtedly
very familiar. In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court articulated a zone
of freedom for adult sexual conduct: "The State cannot demean [people's]
existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a
crime.",25 0 The private nature of the conduct and the "full and mutual
consent" between the parties were central to the Court's decision, and, as
noted earlier, the Court exempted public sex and cases where one party
"might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where
consent might not easily be refused."251
Although many did not agree with Justice Scalia's prediction that
252Lawrence heralded the advent of same-sex marriage, Just a decade later
248. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-831.01 (West 2001).
249. See Stuntz, supra note 214.
250. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
251. Id. at 578 (emphasis added) (concluding that even rarely-enforced criminal bans have far-
reaching consequences, including the stigmatization of groups of people and invasion of privacy,
because the bans "touch[] upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most
private of places, the home" and that "[t]he stigma this criminal statute imposes, moreover, is not
trivial. The offense, to be sure, is but a class C misdemeanor, a minor offense.... Still, it remains a
criminal offense with all that imports for the dignity of the persons charged.").
252. Id. at 604-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is 'no
legitimate state interest' . . . what justification could there possibly be for denying the benefits of
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the Court recognized such a right in Windsor and Obergefell. In 2013, the
Court ruled that section three of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was
unconstitutional.2 53 In doing so, it emphasized the dignity and equality that
must be accorded intimate adult choices, such as the choice to be
married.254 Justice Kennedy's opinion recognized that DOMA impacted not
only same-sex adults who sought to "enhance their own liberty" through
marriage, 255 but also their children: "DOMA instructs all federal officials,
and indeed all persons with whom same-sex couples interact, including
their own children, that their marriage is less worthy than the marriages of
others."256
Following Windsor, courts across the country struck down same-sex
marriage bans extremely rapidly.2 57 In 2015, the Court finished the arc
Lawrence had started and declared a right to same-sex marriage. 2 5 8 The
Obergefell opinion emphasized autonomy and equality as key to
humanity. 2 59 It also specified children's interests in the recognition of a
widening circle of families, opining:
[A] "basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards
children and families . . . [otherwise] children suffer the stigma of
knowing their families are somehow lesser. They also suffer the
significant material costs of being raised by unmarried parents,
relegated through no fault of their own to a more difficult and
uncertain family life. The marriage laws at issue here thus harm
and humiliate the children of same-sex couples." 2 60
Scholars have read this line of cases to limit the state's power not just
to regulate same-sex conduct, but instead as binding the state from
infringing upon consensual sex and family formation more broadly. As
Cary Franklin put it, "[These cases] placed a series of limits on the state's
power to enforce a single, traditional model of sexuality and the family." 26 1
marriage to homosexual couples exercising '[t]he liberty protected by the Constitution?' (quoting
majority opinion))(alteration in original). He also predicted that it "decree[d] the end of all 'morals
legislation,"' including incest, id. at 599, a prediction that did not prove accurate. See Murray, supra
note 56.
253. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
254. Id. at 2692-93 (noting our "evolving understanding of the meaning of equality" and that the
choice to marry goes to one's very humanity or "personhood").
255. Id. at 2695.
256. Id at 2696.
257. See Tom Watts, From Windsor to Obergefell: The Struggle for Marriage Equality
Continued, 9 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. ONLNE S52, S65-68 (2015).
258. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 2600-01.
261. Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay Rights, 100
VA. L. REV. 817, 830 (2014) (remarking that "courts have situated recent marriage cases in a broader
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This jurisprudence combines "personal dignity and autonomy"262 with
equality to create what Laurence Tribe has termed "equal dignity." 263 This
right--one with long doctrinal roots but not fully articulated until
Obergefell-protects individual choices about family and intimacy because
these choices go to the core of our humanity.2" This protection of intimate
choice is particularly important for those making unpopular choices; this
line of cases shields individuals "standing against the forces of coerced
conformity."265
Conformity can be imposed via the denial of state recognition of
marriage and parenthood, but it is most coercive when implemented via
criminalization and punishment. The Lawrence opinion emphasized the
significant harms on liberty of even underenforced laws with minor
penalties.266 Accordingly, scholars have found in Lawrence grounds to
argue against criminalization of adult consensual intimacy of all types.
Melissa Murray and Alice Ristroph, for instance, describe how criminal
statutes, such as bigamy laws, "constitute efforts to establish an official
family model," enshrining a gendered hierarchy and prioritizing
marriage.267 They argue that protection of intimate choices and changing
family forms require that the family be "disestablished," i.e., that the state
get out of the business of bolstering normative family frameworks and,
particularly, prohibiting or punishing "'deviant' ones via the criminal
law. 26 8
The Lawrence-Obergefell line of cases does not just impact adult
rights to intimacy. Children were at the center of the debates on same-sex
marriage and, as I noted above, figure heavily in both the Windsor and
strand of liberty jurisprudence"). Despite their transformative impact, I and other scholars have
critiqued the same-sex marriage cases for simultaneously reifying marriage and entrenching traditional
gender stereotypes. See Godsoe, supra note 6, at 153 (critiquing the litigation, particularly the plaintiff
selection, and resultant opinion for reifying "a particular type of relationship and family-traditional
and conformist").
262. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); see
also Kenji Yoshimo, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 155,
170 (2015) (remarking that Kennedy first articulated this connection in Casey).
263. Tribe, supra note 15.
264. Yoshimo, supra note 262, at 170 (noting that "[w]hile Obergefell makes repeated reference
to dignity, it focuses more on the concept of liberty"); see also Tribe, supra note 15, at 22 (arguing that
Obergefell represents "the idea that all individuals are deserving in equal measure of personal
autonomy and freedom to "'define [his or her] own concept of existence' instead of having their
identity and social role defined by the state" (alteration in original) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851)).
265. Tribe, supra note 15, at 20-24, 26; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence's
Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes in Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV.
1021, 1025 (2004) (terming the connection between liberty and equality a "jurisprudence of tolerance").
266. See discussion supra note 251.
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Obergefell opinions. 26 9 Children's rights-to equality, family relationships,
and autonomy--can accordingly find some support in these cases. 2 7 0 This
builds on a growing call by scholars and courts for recognition of
children's relational and human rights.2 71 My point is not that this line of
cases creates children's rights, or equalizes them to those of adults. Rather,
I am illustrating that Obergefell and the other same-sex marriage cases
imply children's personhood and dignity of their own, an interest, if not a
right, in not being "humiliated." This, in turn, both changes the parent-
child relationship by strengthening limitations on parental rights to treat
their children however they wish, and alters governmental power to
regulate the family and intimate conduct.272 Such regulation must take into
account harms to children even if it seems to apply only to adult conduct. 273
Courts have also taken notice of this new constitutional family law,
decriminalizing more sexual conduct and emphasizing children's interests
in family bonds. 27 4 As noted earlier, in Lawrence's wake, courts struck
down criminal adultery, fornication, and cohabitation laws, significantly
widening the ambit of protected consensual sex.275 Courts have also
emphasized children's interests in recognizing expanded parenthood status.
269. See discussion supra note 260.
270. See, e.g., Catherine Smith, Obergefell's Missed Opportunity, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
223, 223, 227 (2016) (regretting that the Obergefell Court "[fell] short of a transformative or pivotal
paradigm shift on behalf of children and their rights," but arguing that, nonetheless, "Obergefell's
legitimate concern for addressing the social, economic, and psychological harm to children ... [offers]
a window of opportunity to advance children's equal protection rights"); see also Susan Hazeldean,
Anchoring More Than Babies: Children's Rights After Obergefell v. Hodges, 38 CARDOZO L. REV.
1397, 1431 (2016) ("Obergefell suggests that children have a right to live with their parents," and
specifically applying this right to the case of children of undocumented parents). Smith notes that these
cases build on an earlier, more explicitly child-centered constitutional jurisprudence, including the
illegitimacy cases and Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). Smith, supra at 228-31.
271. See JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (2006); see also BARBARA
BENNETT WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: THE TRAGEDY OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS FROM BEN
FRANKLIN TO LIONEL TATE (2008). Some scholars have also argued that corporal punishment must be
abolished because of children's rights. See, e.g., Deanna A. Pollard, Banning Corporal Punishment: A
Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. U. L. REv. 447 (2003). This is consistent with but distinct from my
argument. My argument is that an accurate assessment of the family status/harms nexus militates
towards criminalization of this harmful conduct towards children. Accordingly, children need not be
rights-bearers more broadly for my argument.
272. This is consistent with scholarship positing parents as trustees, rather than owners, of their
children. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REv. 2401 (1995);
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14
CARDOZO L. REv. 1747, 1814 (1993) (outlining a "generist" framework wherein parents are tasked with
nurturing children as trustees rather than owners).
273. Such harms, as outlined in Windsor and Obergefell, may be physical, societal, financial, or
psychological.
274. For optimism about the impact of Obergefell on other intimate choices than same-sex
marriage, see Tribe, supra note 15, at 17, 32 (remarking that "Obergefell is an important landmark, but
it will not be-and should not be-the last word" and that apart from a "distressing marriage myopia,"
the opinion is "otherwise farsighted and fully capable of expanding our understanding of the
Constitution to protect new freedoms as we come to appreciate them").
275. See discussion supra note 54.
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For instance, the New York Court of Appeals in 2016 recognized de facto
parenthood for the first time recently, overruling its own relatively recent
decision.276 In doing so, it relied heavily on Obergefell to emphasize
"equality for same-sex parents" and "the opportunity for their children to
have the love and support" of their functional parents.277 The court
extensively discussed the harm to children of not having de facto
parenthood, analogizing to the "stigma" marriage bans visited on children
and citing the large number of "nontraditional families" as well as social
science literature on parent-child attachment.27 8
To be clear, I am not arguing that Lawrence-Obergefell means that all
adult intimate conduct will be decriminalized; 2 79 as a practical matter, this
expansion is unlikely in the near future, if ever. Commentators have more
realistically predicted that change would come incrementally,
distinguishing LGBT individuals from smaller and more marginalized
groups of people. Pamela Karlan, for instance, describes the limits of
Lawrence:
"[T]he Court [did not] recognize[]-and almost certainly never
will-that individuals have an absolute constitutionally protected
interest in following their individually defined bliss. . . . [T]he
Court is most likely to recognize rights which reflect the practices
of large numbers of people whose lives the Court otherwise finds
worthy of respect.2 8 0
Bearing this out, the few courts addressing post-Lawrence challenges
to incest prohibitions have upheld the constitutional validity of such
challenges. For instance, the Sixth Circuit upheld an Ohio law
criminalizing adult incest, finding the law served a rational state basis of
preserving family unity and preventing coercion or exploitation.2 8 1 Two
factors, however, limit the import of these decisions for my proposal. First,
they were mostly limited in the scope of their review because the
challenges were presented on habeas petition.282 Second, most of the cases
concern vertical incest, as in Lowe.2 83 These intergenerational cases are
276. Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991), overruled by Brooke S.B. v.
Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488 (N.Y. 2016).
277. Brook S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 499.
278. Id.
279. Or relatedly, that the children and family relations within these unions will be protected.
280. Karlan, supra note 33, at 1458-60.
281. Lowe v. Swanson, 663 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2011).
282. Id. at 263 (remarking that it was governed by AEDPA); see also Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d
808, 813 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting the "limited power of a federal court" on habeas review).
283. But see Muth, 412 F.3d at 818 (affirming the sentence of adult siblings for incest because,
inter alia, "Lawrence did not announce a fundamental right of adults to engage in all forms of private
consensual sexual conduct").
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arguably prone to exploitation and thus fall within the exception recognized
in Lawrence itself.
D. Exculpation v. Inculpation
The analysis of relational crime is not exactly parallel for exculpation
and inculpation. This is both because of the presumption against
284
criminalization, and more importantly, because we are asking a different
question in these two instances.285 For exculpation, we must ask whether
there are sufficient reasons-pragmatic, societal, or other-to mitigate or
forgive a pre-existing offense because of the relationship. For inculpation,
we must ask whether the relationship creates a harm, or is a good proxy for
harm, sufficient to criminalize otherwise non-culpable conduct.
This Part has theorized a three-part inquiry to assess relational crimes.
To rectify the distortions in harms and family status, this framework
centers on a functional family structure that is sensitive to power dynamics
within the family that may mitigate or generate harms and is animated by
familial autonomy and equality norms.
IV. RIGHTSIZING RELATIONAL CRIME
In this Part, I apply my framework to the two case studies of adult
incest and corporal punishment. Close scrutiny of the harms in these cases,
and the relational role in neutralizing or worsening them, leads me to
different conclusions for the two offenses. First, I argue for abolition of the
parental discipline privilege. The parental discipline privilege ignores real
harms to society's most vulnerable members and perpetuates a patriarchal
family structure that is outdated and constitutionally unsound.
My conclusion as to adult incest is more complex because some of it
captures real harms stemming from the relationship. Through this lens of
power differentials, I argue that relational inculpation based on outdated
284. There are numerous framings of this central value. A more philosophical one is the
minimalist principle permitting criminalization only when less severe regulatory measures fail. See
ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRlNCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 33-34 (5th ed. 2006). A more narrow doctrinal
iteration is the statutory rule of lenity favoring criminal defendants. The rule of lenity requires that
"ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity" to the
defendant. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1088 (2015). In Yates, the Court construed the term
"tangible object" not to include fish, a strained result that was widely seen as reviving the rule of lenity
amidst concerns about overcriminalization. See, e.g., Todd Haugh, Overcriminalization's New Harm
Paradigm, 68 VAND. L. REv. 1191 (2015).
285. My thanks to Sasha Natapoff for this important point.
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notions of morality or gender hierarchies should be abolished, while those
based on a high risk of or actual exploitation between the victim and
offender should remain. Specifically, horizontal incest should be
decriminalized. Conversely, the statutory reach of vertical incest should be
expanded to include stepfathers and other functional parents. I address
concerns about the distributional effects and scope of my proposals but
ultimately conclude that these boundaries of relational liability best fulfill
the principles of the criminal and family law.
A. Abolish the Parental Disciplinary Privilege
I argue against the parental disciplinary privilege because it condones
documented harm and perpetuates intrafamilial violence for no legitimate
reason. The privilege is based on "folk wisdom" about child rearing rather
than science, and perpetuates an outdated family structure inconsistent with
normative commitments of equality and autonomy. Nor is the exculpation
of parent-child assault constitutionally required. In contrast, the state duty
to protect children may even mandate criminalization.
Corporal punishment sometimes brings physical harms, and there is
overwhelming evidence that even in mild forms, it brings psychological
and other harms, adding up to an increased societal risk of antisocial
conduct and violence.286 These harms are likely worsened because they are
inflicted by someone close to the child, indeed the person entrusted with his
or her care. The slippery slope between arguably non-harmful corporal
punishment and abuse compounds the danger. As one court recently put it:
"[The state interest in protecting children] is particularly powerful in the
context of corporal punishment, given the risk that the parental privilege
defense will be used as a cover for instances of child abuse."287
Demonstrating that the use of terminology such as "spanking" obscures
these harms, significantly more people disapprove of corporal punishment
when it is accurately labeled as "assault," or "hitting," or "beating.",2 8 8
Assault and battery are core offenses in our criminal law, and parental
assault on children remains the only widespread categorical exception.
Corporal punishment of children has been banned in other settings,
including, in a majority of states, in schools, based on concern about the
harms of corporal punishment and the greater effectiveness of non-physical
disciplinary methods.2 8 9 As noted earlier, the Secretary of Education under
286. See discussion supra notes 89-92.
287. Commonwealth v. Dorvil, 32 N.E.3d 861, 868 (Mass. 2015).
288. See Kerr, supra note 18.
289. See discussion supra notes 85-86; see also Hendrix, supra note 80. As of 2016, twenty-
eight states and the District of Columbia have banned corporal punishment in schools, and the vast
majority of children "paddled" in schools live in just five states. Melinda D. Anderson, Where Teachers
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President Obama recently called for a complete ban on school corporal
punishment, citing extensive data that it is "harmful [and] ineffective" and
arguing that "[a]s the evidence against corporal punishment mounts, so
does our moral responsibility to eliminate this practice." 290 There are, of
course, significant differences between teacher and parental corporal
punishment, given the unique status of the family unit. But the majority of
states do not allow teacher corporal punishment even where a parent
permits it or wants it, reflecting an evolving consensus on the problems
with physical discipline.2 9 '
Having determined that the parental discipline privilege condones
empirically proven harm that is long recognized in our criminal law, we
turn to the second part of the inquiry-does family status justify this
exception to a preexisting offense? I argue that it does not for several
reasons. First, perhaps there is a pragmatic reason to allow parents to
assault children as they are the ones raising them on a day-to-day basis.
Yet, the research clearly shows that corporal punishment does not work to
discipline children and, as I have detailed, in fact harms them. This
research undermines the most commonly cited rationales of child rearing:
folk wisdom and tradition. Recall that many jurisdictions do not justify the
privilege at all; instead, it has simply remained on the books since
Blackstone's time.292 Tradition alone cannot justify harms or the denial of
some persons' rights; just as our understandings of marriage "[have]
evolved over time" so must our conception of parenthood, and its
concomitant duties and privileges.29 3
A contemporary assessment of the privilege is particularly necessary
because it perpetuates intrafamilial inequalities. Similarly to intimate
partner violence, experts have connected parental violence more broadly to
inequality, particularly patriarchy. 2 94 This hierarchy entrenched in the
criminal law flies in the face of the normative commitments to familial
autonomy and equality, including children's interests or quasi-rights. As
with once permissible intimate partner violence, parent-child violence is no
longer in accord with our constitutional family terrain.
Are Still Allowed to Spank Students, ATLANTIC (Dec. 15, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/12/corporal-punishment/420420.
290. King letter, supra note 86.
291. See Anderson, supra note 289.
292. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 65, at 440.
293. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595 (2015) (describing how marriage "has not
stood in isolation from developments in law and society. The history of marriage is one of both
continuity and change."). Justice Kennedy elaborates on the abolition of gendered inequities
characterizing marriage historically, such as the coverture doctrine, concluding that "changed
understandings of marriage are characteristic of a Nation where new dimensions of freedom become
apparent to new generations ... Id. at 2596.
294. See, e.g., RICHARD J. GELLES & MURRAY A. STRAUS, INTIMATE VIOLENCE 30-32 (1988).
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Abolishing the discipline privilege is consistent not only with the same-
sex marriage jurisprudence, but also with parental rights. There is no
federal constitutional right for parents to corporally punish children. Few
statutes explicitly cite parental rights as underlying the privilege, but
several lower courts have relied in part on parental rights.29 5 Even those
courts, however, clarify that this activity is limited; as one court bluntly put
it, "Child abuse is not a constitutionally protected activity."296 I take the
argument further and contend that constitutional norms are not a bar, and
indeed may militate, towards the abolition of corporal punishment. The
malleable and more limited nature of parental rights, coupled with an
evolving consensus about legitimate childrearing practices, differentiates
parental rights from other privacy rights.2 97 This distinction is illustrated in
concrete ways: the Court has declined to apply strict scrutiny to state
regulation of parental rights and has made clear that the state may intervene
where there is harm to the child or society of any kind, and likely where it
acts "reasonably" to regulate children's education, health, and general
care. 298
Parental rights are largely justified by the presumption that parents act
with their children's best interests in mind, so the benefits of parenthood
are intertwined with obligations.2 99 Relying in part on this framework,
Jennifer Collins has argued for more consistent and stringent prosecution of
parents who negligently kill their children: "[P]rosecution can reinforce the
normative judgment that parents have a greater responsibility to their
children because of their decision to assume the obligations-and the
295. While the statutes codifying the parental discipline privilege never explicitly mention
parental rights, see Appendix A, a few arguably imply parental rights in rendering lawful reasonable
parental corporal punishment. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.430 (2016) (parent or person in loco
parentis has the "authority" to discipline). Some state and lower federal courts articulate such a right,
but also stress its limitations. See, e.g., State v. Wilder, 748 A.2d 444, 449 (Me. 2000) (a parent has the
fundamental right to "use ... reasonable or moderate physical force to control behavior"); State v.
Rosa, 6 N.E.3d 57, 59 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013) (noting "a parent's fundamental constitutional right to
child-rearing, which includes a right to impose reasonable discipline, including the use of corporal
punishment"). But see Sweaney v. Ada County, 119 F.3d 1385, 1389 (9th Cir. 1997). Even the courts
discussing parental rights focus considerably more on tradition and practicality in justifying the parental
discipline privilege. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dorvil, 32 N.E.3d 861, 870 (Mass. 2015).
296. State v. Sinica, 372 N.W.2d 445, 449 (Neb. 1985) (articulating rights to familial privacy and
parental choices in child-rearing).
297. I more fully explore this constitutional argument in a forthcoming essay for a symposium on
the Constitution and the family. See Cynthia Godsoe, Redefining Parental Rights, 31 CONST.
COMMENT. 281 (2017); see also David D. Meyer, Family Diversity and the Rights ofParenthood, in
WHAT IS PARENTHOOD?: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ABOUT THE FAMILY 29, 31 (Linda McClain &
Daniel Cere eds., 2013) (demonstrating that modem jurisprudence establishes parental rights as
"essentially soft" and merely presumptive based on the need to accommodate societal and children's
interests).
298. In the most recent case, Troxel v. Granville, the Court articulated only a presumption in
favor of a fit parent's choices rather than a fundamental right. 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
299. Parham v. JR., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (a parent's "natural bonds of affection lead [her]
to act in the best interests of [her] children").
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concomitant tremendous rewards and undeniable risks-of the parental
role."300 Corporal punishment should be treated in a similar fashion-no
statutory exemption even if enforcement should not be as parallel to non-
parents, as Collins argues for in the more serious case of child fatalities.
This broad reading of state power has allowed for greater curtailment
of parental rights with evolving views on children's education and health.
For instance, parents' ability to choose medical care for their children has
been limited in numerous cases far short of life-threatening.30 1 More
recently, constitutional scholars Erwin Chemerinsky and Michele Goodwin
persuasively argue for the constitutionality of mandatory vaccination laws
with no exceptions on childrearing or religious grounds; California in 2016
enacted such a statute. 30 2 Chemerinsky and Goodwin use the harm principle
to justify their argument, contending that "the freedom of one person ends
when it inflicts an injury on another." 30 3 They argue that this prohibition is
particularly true when the victims are vulnerable children, and the
offenders are parents, legally entrusted with their care.3 04 Just as "[s]trong
and irrefutable medical and scientific evidence" support compulsory
vaccination against parental rights, so data overwhelmingly demonstrates
that corporal punishment is harmful both to individual children and to
society at large.3 05 Protection is not only for the child's sake but also for
society's, given its need for "the healthy, well-rounded growth of young
people into full maturity as citizens."306
Abolishing the parental discipline privilege is not without costs. Of
particular concern is contributing to the overcriminalization epidemic and
the distributional costs of increasing criminal liability. I share the concern
of many scholars and policymakers about overcriminalization, both as a
300. Collins, Crime and Parenthood, supra note 8, at 812.
301. Godsoe, supra note 297 (discussing cases).
302. S.B. 277 § 2(b), 2015-2016 Leg. (Cal. 2015) ("The governing authority shall not
unconditionally admit any person as a pupil of any private or public elementary or secondary school,
child care center, day nursery, nursery school, family day care home, or development center, unless,
prior to his or her first admission to that institution, he or she has been fully immunized."). See Erwin
Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Compulsory Vaccination Laws Are Constitutional, 110 Nw. U. L.
REv. 589, 594, 603-05 (2016) (describing the passage of a compulsory vaccination law with no
religious or personal belief exemptions despite parental rights arguments against it and also describing
courts' consistent rejection of constitutional challenges to compulsory vaccination laws).
303. Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 26, at 1128.
304. See id. at 1128-31; Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 302, at 594 (describing the
passage of a compulsory vaccination law with no religious or personal belief exemptions despite
parental rights arguments against it).
305. Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 302, at 614; see also Meyer, supra note 297, at 136
(arguing that even "a significant state incursion on a fundamental family liberty is not necessarily
unconstitutional").
306. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
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whole and in its disproportionate impacts on certain communities.30 7 The
state's record of fairly intervening to address family behavior, particularly
parenting, is fairly abysmal.308
Nonetheless, I conclude that with appropriately tailored laws, the
benefits outweigh the costs for the victim class of often very young
children.309 One major reason for this is that some parental corporal
punishment is already criminalized; the state already intervenes in families
to police parental discipline. The current vague laws and blurry line
between acceptable corporal punishment and abuse likely worsen the
disproportionate enforcement endemic to state intervention. One state
appellate court recently characterized this area of the law as the most
"fraught with subjectivity," and opined that it impedes the notice function
of the criminal law given that "one's guilt or innocence depend[s] upon
how someone else [i.e. the judge or jurors] disciplines his or her children
when there is no consensus about what is appropriate." 310 There is great
value to more clearly drawn lines-instead of reasonable or not excessive
corporal punishment, no corporal punishment at all-both in diluting
discretion and sending a sharp expressive message about appropriate
conduct.
To address the concerns outlined above, the ban on parental corporal
punishment could be a violation subject to ticketing rather than severe
penalties, or a civil ban subject to fines.3 1 1 As such, it would play a role
educating the public as to the harms of corporal punishment, and hopefully
decreasing its use. Many European countries banning it have done so via a
civil ban, or a criminal ban that was rarely enforced.3 12 For instance,
307. See Godsoe, supra note 45 (arguing for the decriminalization of peer statutory rape in part
based on these overcriminalization concerns).
308. With other scholars, I have critiqued state intervention into the family in the name of
protection, as punitive measures are focused disproportionately on already-marginalized families,
particularly low-income single mothers of color. See Cynthia Godsoe, Parsing Parenthood, 17 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REv. 113 (2013) (critiquing state intervention in regulating parenting, particularly the child
protection system); see also Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon's Servants and the Criminalization ofPoverty,
12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 445, 446 (2015) (describing how "the criminal system and the welfare state knit
poverty and criminality together, functionally as well as ideologically").
309. Weighing these costs and benefits is very difficult, particularly taking into account the
implementation of the criminal law in the "real world." I discuss this balance further in a contribution to
a forthcoming book on the politicization of safety, still concluding that intrafamilial assault should be
criminalized, as are other assaults, while also arguing that criminalization must be accompanied by
other methods such as public education and restorative justice. See Godsoe, supra note 165.
310. Carter v. State, 67 N.E.3d 1041, 1049 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (Crone, J., concurring).
311. This could be similar to the highly successful civil bans on smoking in workplaces and
public venues.
312. See Joan E. Durrant & Staffan Janson, Law Reform, Corporal Punishment and Child Abuse:
The Case of Sweden, 12 INT'L. REV. VICTIMOLOGY 139, 155-56 (2005). Underenforced laws present
their own problems, including being particularly vulnerable to selective or discriminatory enforcement.
See Godsoe, supra note 45 (discussing this in the peer statutory rape context). They can, however,
perform a valuable educational purpose. See Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold?, supra note 54, at 58
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Sweden, the first country to ban corporal punishment, "aimed [its law] at
educating the Swedish public, not at prosecuting parents."3 13 Despite
virtually no prosecutions of parents under the new law, the national
prevalence of corporal punishment declined significantly in the twenty
years following the ban.314 A civil ban on parental corporal punishment
does not send as strong an expressive message about assault as would a
criminal sanction but may best balance the enforcement concerns in the
family context.
B. Redraw the Boundaries ofAdult Incest
Adult incest requires more nuanced conclusions. While some of its
sweep is based on outdated and illegitimate stereotypes about sex and
family relationships, others reflect real power differentials and an
unacceptable risk of exploitation and non-consent. The lines of liability
need to be redrawn to best capture these harms while not limiting familial
autonomy and punishing non-traditional families. Specifically, horizontal
incest should be decriminalized. In contrast, vertical incest should be
expanded to include functional parents and other relatives (such as step-
uncles) a generation older.
1. Eliminate Inculpation Based on Flawed Science, or Morality
Scrutinizing the purported harms of horizontal incest reveals that they
are insufficiently proven or concrete for criminalization. The two main
rationales for incest bans, genetics and family unity, do not suffice. The
genetics rationale is based on flawed science and is inconsistent with other
regulation of reproduction. The family unity rationale is amorphous and
both over and underinclusive. On the one hand, it includes siblings and
cousins who have never met, and thus are not part of a family unit. On the
other hand, it does not include functional and stepsiblings who have grown
up together.
First, the genetics rationale. Although it remains one of the most
frequently cited rationales for incest bans,315 its scientific validity is
exaggerated, and the ban is inconsistent with other regulation of
reproduction. Incestuous relationships between siblings, and between
(describing a state's option to "maintain a prohibition but to enforce it rarely" and listing examples
including mild speeding, teenage alcohol use, and marijuana use).
313. Durrant & Janson, supra note 312, at 142 (quoting a legislator). Sweden banned corporal
punishment in 1978. See Dennis Alan Olsen, The Swedish Ban of Corporal Punishment, 1984 BYU L.
REv. 447, 447 (1984).
314. Durrant & Janson, supra note 312, at 143-44.
315. See Cahill, supra note 190.
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parents and children, do slightly increase the risk of birth abnormalities.3 16
This risk, however, is not significant in one-generation pairings, as opposed
to generations of inbreeding which led to the infamous Romanov
hemophilia and Hapsburg chins. 1 Indeed, there are arguably some genetic
societal benefits from inbreeding, as harmful recessive genes are eventually
eliminated. 3 18 There is very little risk in pairings between first cousins or
half siblings,3 19 and of course none at all between step or adopted siblings,
who are prohibited from sexual relationships in many states.3 20 The lower
biological risk has led to decriminalization of first cousin incest provisions
in several jurisdictions, but the sweep of horizontal incest regulation is still
too broad.32 1 At the same time, the fact that incest laws almost all include
relatives incapable of reproduction, and many include same-sex incest,
demonstrates that the genetic consequences are not the main harm at issue.
Even more significantly, the criminal incest ban is out-of-step with
other laws regulating reproduction. We do not, for instance, require that
any adults, even those with recessive genes that present a greater risk, be
tested before having children. 32 2 Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART)
provides a particularly apt comparison. Laws in every state allow
anonymous sperm donation, creating the very real possibility that siblings,
cousins and other biologically related people could "accidentally" commit
incest.323 Given the increasing rates of ART, were incest to pose a
significant biological risk, sperm donation would have to be regulated. This
inconsistency has led politicians and criminal justice experts in Canada and
316. See id.
317. See id.; see also Vera Bergelson, Vice is Nice But Incest is Best: The Problem of a Moral
Taboo, 7 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 43, 47 (2013) (questioning the genetic harm of incest). Courts and
legislatures have acknowledged that the science is mixed: while the science of human genetics has
produced inconclusive proof that inbreeding in human populations would eventually show harmful
effects, there is a higher probability of unfortunate, recessive gene combinations in the first generation
offspring of closely related parents. See id.
318. See Jolene Creighton, Genetics and the Benefits ofInbreeding, FUTURISM (Apr. 4, 2014),
https://futurism.com/genetics-and-the-benefits-of-inbreeding-2/.
319. See, e.g., Steve Connor, There's Nothing Wrong with Cousins Getting Married, Scientists
Say, INDEPENDENT (Dec. 24, 2008), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/theres-nothing-wrong-
with-cousins-getting-married-scientists-say-1210072.htmil.
320. See Note, supra note 189, 2474-75 (mentioning incest statutes of Alabama, Missouri, Utah,
Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia).
321. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-202 (2013); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-1-1, 15-1-2
(2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West 2015).
322. This fact also led prominent criminal law scholar Eugene Volokh to be "skeptical about" the
biological rationale. See Eugene Volokh, Incest, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 12, 2010, 12:40 PM),
http://volokh.com/2010/12/12/incest.
323. See John K. Critser, Current Status of Semen Banking in the USA, 13 J. HUM. REPROD.,
supp. 2, 1998, at 55. Tellingly, Iceland has one of the most highly regulated sperm donation systems
because its tiny and closely related population makes repeated accidental incest very likely. See Ian
Steadman, App to Prevent 'Accidental Incest' Proves a Hit with Icelanders, WIRED (Apr. 18, 2013),
http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-04/18/iceland-incest-app.
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several European countries to call for the decriminalization of sibling
324incest. In the furthest step yet on this issue, a German government ethics
council called for repeal of bans on sibling incest, concluding that the
biological risk is not sufficient to warrant criminalization. 3 2 5
Nor does a family unity rationale justify criminalizing horizontal
incest. The contours of the ban, which punish some types of horizontal
incest that are unrelated to family units while exculpating others because
the siblings or cousins are not related by blood or marriage, reveal the
law's use to police traditional family boundaries.326 Indeed, incest can harm
real families, as the Muth and other cases show. Recognizing this, a French
court recently ordered the state to award both parents of a child born to an
incestuous half-sibling couple legal parenthood of their daughter. The court
drew on the European Convention on Human Rights and considered the
child's best interests to change the longstanding rule that only one parent
can be recognized where a child is born of incest. 327
Punishment is also not consistent with current constitutional values.
Like other consensual adult sex, horizontal incest is harmless private
conduct that Lawrence should protect from state punishment. Punishment
is largely driven by revulsion or disgust for non-mainstream intimacy, a
governmental interest that should not meet the meaningful rational review
given morals legislation.328 Other governments have recognized that
"preserv[ing] a social taboo" is not a legitimate use of the criminal law.329
Turning to the second part of the inquiry, status as a sibling or cousin
does not generate harm or risk of harm to change the nature of the
324. Countries include Canada, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, and Germany. See, e.g.,
Thaddeus Baklinski, 'Sibling Incest Should Be Legal,' Says Danish Professor of Criminal Justice
Ethics, LIFESITE (Oct. 17, 2014), https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/sibling-incest-should-be-legal-
says-danish-professor-of-criminal-justice-et (quoting a criminal justice ethics expert arguing that the
rise in accidental incest from artificial insemination should lead us to "rethink the 'old taboos' against
incest"); Lizzie Dearden & Elsa Vulliamy, Incest and Necrophilia 'Should Be Legal' According to
Youth Branch of Swedish Liberal People's Party, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 24, 2016),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/incest-and-necrophilia-should-be-legal-youth-
swedish-liberal-peoples-party-a6891476.html (arguing that incest "can be considered unusual and
disgusting," but the law "can not stem from it being disgusting").
325. Lizzie Dearden, German Ethics Council Calls for Incest Between Siblings to Be Legalised
by Government, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 24 2014),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/german-ethics-council-calls-for-incest-between-
siblings-to-be-legalised-by-govemment-9753506.html.
326. This does not comport with today's demographic reality. See supra note 241 (citing census
data to show the prevalence of "non-traditional" families).
327 See Jon Sharman, Mother Wins Official Parentage ofDaughter She Unwittingly Had with
Long-lost Half-Brother, THE INDEPENDENT (Sept. 22, 2017),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/mother-parentage-daughter-unwitting-long-lost-
brother-incest-half-siblings-france-caen-rose-marie-a7958056.htm.
328. See Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2005); supra notes 193-195 (discussing Muth).
Scholars have interpreted Lawrence to require this. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 224. Thanks to Julie
Nice for this point.
329. Dearden, supra note 325.
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consensual sex. Unlike vertical incest, and various categories of adult
statutory rape, there are not sufficiently extreme power differentials to
transform this protected conduct into a criminal offense. Criminalizing
morally despised but harmless conduct contributes to overcriminalization
with its many attendant costs. This use of the criminal law to bolster a
bionormative traditional family also threatens autonomy and equality
norms.
2. Retain Inculpation Based on Power Differentials and Exploitation
In contrast, vertical incest should remain a crime, because status as a
parent, uncle or grandparent, reflects real power differentials and
concomitant risks of harm. The criminal law is paying increasing attention
to the harms of exploitation and the fact that interpersonal power
relationships impede meaningful consent.3 30 The risk of exploitation in
vertical incest is greater than that in most couplings, more akin to that in
trafficking and adult statutory rape by position or authority than in other
sexual encounters.331 One leading scholar has urged a focus on the
legitimacy of the pressure used to compel sex. 33 2 Surely the pressure of a
parent for his or her child's sexual intimacy is among the most illegitimate
(and difficult to resist). Accordingly, although including all psychological
or economic coercion in consent assessments would be unworkable,
vertical incest is different enough to merit this treatment.
Lawrence presents no bar to the punishment of vertical incest because
it prohibits only the punishment of truly consensual, and thus harmless,
adult sexual intimacy.333 Indeed, vertical incest implicates a power
differential so large that it sits squarely within the Lawrence exception for
cases "where consent might not easily be refused."3 34 Most courts
considering adult incest cases post-Lawrence have reasoned consistently
with this, affirming the punishment of vertical, rather than horizontal,
incest.335 The Sixth Circuit, for instance, affirmed the conviction of a
stepfather for incest with his adult stepdaughter, noting the potential for
coercion in this relationship "regardless of age."
330. See supra notes 174-182 (discussing adult statutory rape laws and the proposed MPC
expansion to include sexual assault by exploitation and coercion).
331. See supra notes 174-182.
332. Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2151,
2180 (1995).
333. See Cass R. Sunstein, Liberty After Lawrence, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1059, 1063 (2004) (reading
Lawrence this way although perhaps also considering widespread societal disapproval in his calculus of
harm).
334. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
335. But see Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 813-15 (7th Cir. 2005)
336. Lowe v. Swanson, 663 F.3d 258, 260-61, 264 (6th Cir. 2011).
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I argue not only for the ongoing criminalization of vertical incest, but
also for an expanded scope. Because the power differential exists for
biological and functional fathers, the scope of liability should include
stepfathers and others in a parental relationship to most effectively deter
and punish the harm. The diagram below depicts the redrawn boundaries of
both horizontal and vertical incest.




Horzontal Incest Verical Incest punts





and functiona parents (such as
step uncles, ganudpauens etc.)
337. Figure 2 depicts the current boundaries of incest laws in a majority of states. Figure 3
represents my recommendation for redrawing the boundaries of incest.
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This crime needs to be renamed as well as resized. Vertical incest is
most accurately described as a sex offense, akin to other non-consensual or
exploitative rape, rather than an offense against the family or morality.3 3 8
Changing its designation is essential to express condemnation of the real
harms at issue, while also educating the public about the lack of harms in
non-normative but consensual adult sex. Refraining vertical incest as
centered on exploitation, rather than inaccurate science or societal disgust,
both reinforces the need for empirically-based, rather than moralistic,
criminal policies and expresses societal condemnation of non-consensual
sex.
Clarifying the harm at issue as exploitation and lack of consent will
also limit prosecutions to the true offender, the party from the older
generation. Rightsized incest laws, as with most statutory rape laws, would
not be applicable against the protected party.33 9 This has tremendous import
both for the real lives of victims and for the expressive message of the
criminal law. The consistent treatment of victims and offenders is essential
to respect the worth of various types of victims and for a legitimate
punishment framework.340
I finish by considering a potential objection to my proposal-that the
categories of vertical and horizontal incest are both over and
underinclusive. There is some validity to this argument; for instance, there
may well be a heightened risk of exploitation among even same-generation
family members and a lack of exploitation among certain intergenerational
couples. Nonetheless, although generational lines do not always reflect age
or power differences, they are a reasonable proxy for exploitation given the
legal and societal status of parents and other "elders." Moreover, age, and
the relative ages of parties, is legally relevant to assessing consent as seen
in the longstanding statutory rape law framework.341 Finally, my redrawn
framework is more narrowly tailored than the current incest framework,
which criminalizes all biological incest while exculpating other parental
figures such as stepfathers. There are always line-drawing problems in the
338. See discussion supra Part I.B.
339. In prior work I have extensively critiqued the punishment of young people for their own
exploitation via prostitution or peer statutory rape prosecutions. See Godsoe, supra note 164.
340. Male victims are particularly unlikely to be seen as victims. One recent case involves a
nineteen-year-old and his thirty-six-year-old mother, and both were charged and incarcerated. See
Brooke Self, Trial Dates Set for Mother, Son in NM Incest Case, KLEW NEWS (Nov. 23, 2016),
http://klewtv.com/news/nation-world/trial-dates-set-for-mother-son-in-clovis-incest-case; see generally
Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CALiF. L. REv. 1259, 1259 (2011) (arguing that the criminal justice
system fails to recognize or punish the rape of male victims).
341. See Godsoe, supra note 45.
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criminal law, and this proposal best punishes harm while respecting
constitutional values.
CONCLUSION
The last decade has brought a revolution in the regulation of intimate
partnerships, with the decriminalization of non-normative sex and the
articulation of a right to marry someone of the same sex. In contrast, the
regulation of the parent-child relationship has stayed remarkably static,
particularly in the criminal law. Structured around a hierarchy of ownership
and laden with outdated gendered and bionormative stereotypes about sex,
the current relational crime framework forgives severe harms in the name
of family.
My goal in this article has not been to argue that the treatment of
parents and children must exactly mirror that of spouses or other adult
couples, nor to prove that family status should never, as a normative matter,
influence criminal liability. Children have unique needs, and family
relationships can mitigate or generate harms. Rather, my narrower point is
that the autonomy and equality values animating sexual intimacy and
marriage jurisprudence can open the way to a more coherent and just
theoretical paradigm for assessing harms within other family relationships.
Nowhere is this more necessary than in the parent-child context. Structured
around the archetypal power imbalance, this relationship is particularly
susceptible to cultural biases and non-empirical rationales. As a result,
rather than giving special deference to parental conduct, scholars,
reformers, and lawmakers should closely scrutinize it and be less tolerant
of injury by those entrusted with the care and custody of another. Only in
this fashion can the criminal justice system fulfill its goals of accurately
and fairly assessing harm and according punishment.
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APPENDIX B
Rtaegatuteg Icest Crime Blologkssal Adoptive Step Parents Biological Adopttve Step Grand-
Inet Designation Parents parents Grand-parents Grand-parents parents
Model Pena I P fne§l 1 § 230.1, against the x xCoe 230.2 fmily ____________________
AL ST ~ A- OfneAlabama 13- against the X x 5JJ x x
family ___ ___ ________
AK ST Offbsee
Alaska § 11.41,450 againat thi x
Person ______ ____________
Aioa AZ ST § 13-
3r6on Fassilyoffess x








________ ~~goodmnieals ________ ________
Offen"e




CnetctCT ST § 53a- Lited withCo9oeBigaay a x x
District of DC CODE with sexual
Colombia 1 22-3008 abuse x x
Offeoa
Deaae DESTTIIl Against teDela7ar Personi - listed so is It In TH so§ wit rope +
___________ ~~oilher offenses_____ ____________ _____
FlST
Florida §826.04 wAtlbiany x x
Geri AST § 16-6- under sexual x
Georg~a 22 offenses XX
Offenses
HaT131IIST § 707- Against thea x
741 Person, 'willh
Isexual offenses
Idb D1)ST § 18- withtsexual x
_________ 6602 ofihaf ___________ __________________ 
_____
Ilis IL ST CHI 720 witlisexual XXxVx5ll11i §5t-11 offenes I
in
IN ST 35-46- 1- iscellmaousIodiana 3 offensesa, not X x
with sexual
________ ________ offenses _________ ______________ ____
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Biological Adoptive Aunt. Stop Aunt,
Biological Adoptive tpSilns AuU~ nt I1 eNee, Uncles, NeeFrtCur nLw
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KYST§ with bigamy -
ketcy 530.020 ofibises against X x x x
LSA-R.S. Closer t0
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14:89. bigamy _____ ____ ____
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MI ST 551.3,
Mihga IoST with sexual A xxMihgn 750.520b, MI conduct XXX
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Minnesota MN ST wihbigniny v609.365 ofine agams x v
MS ST §97- wu igslay
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with sexual
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the person
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Hamshrethe lin
New Jersey NIST2C:14-2 une eu 'v
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New Mexico NST offenses against x it103 the fussily
No ok NY PENAL with bigamy -§ 5.5 ofibnsagainst x x
North NC ST § 14- with ofessof
Carl~a 78 public x ~ x xi
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111 Whie the marriAe that creates the relationship exhstt
121 Can marry if over 65 or it under 65 with a cert that says they won't reoroduce.
131 Hawall soecifically includes relationshios created bv domestIc oartnershins.
141 Includes great antincewienhews.
151 Con marry ifoer 599r if a ohysican can say one Party is ermanUtiy stails
161 Can marry if over 65,
171l This relationship is ownished less severely than ether incestous reiationshinot
181 Can marry first coosins if they haVS a DplVsicIanS Cert of ROROtIC COURSeliBp.
191 A man cannot marry his son's widow.
1101 While the marriage that creates the relationship exbts.
1111 Consent is a defenst to incest with a steonon or stoadsEhterif thev are 18 or older
1121 Reconzes this marriage If It was done out of state,
1131 Incest Is only a misdemeoor (tne and/or under onevear imprlionment)
141 While the marriane that cretes the relationshio alst
(151 Can marry if over 65 or if under 65 with a cert that says thev won't reoduce.
1161 Punished more severely.
1171 Punished more severely.
1181 Can marry if ever 65 or if under 65 with a cert that says they wont roduce.


